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Preface 
No one is able to produce a great work without experience, nor fill an influential posi-
tion immediately. In the interval between initial failure and subsequent success, in the 
gap between who we wish to be one day and who we are at present, conflicts and set-
backs are hardly avoidable. The tempting belief that achievement must come easily or 
not at all needs to be corrected because it is ruinous in its effect. It can lead to prema-
ture withdrawal from challenging, but worthwhile and realizable objectives. Eventu-
ally, almost everything valuable legitimately demands endurance and superior effort. 
Knowing that this idea is anything but banal, Friedrich Nietzsche made a couple of 
helpful recommendations for writing novels:  
 
“The recipe for becoming a good novelist…is easy to give, but to carry it out 
presupposes qualities one is accustomed to overlook when one says “I do not 
have enough talent.” One has only to make a hundred or so sketches for nov-
els, none longer than two pages but of such distinctiveness that every word in 
them is necessary; one should write down anecdotes every day until one has 
learnt how to give them the most pregnant and effective form; one should be 
tireless in collecting and describing human types and characters; one should 
above all relate things to others and listen to others relate, keeping one’s eyes 
and ears open for the effect produced on those present, one should, finally, re-
flect on the motives of human actions, disdain no signpost for instruction about 
them and be a collector of these things by day and night. One should continue 
in this many-sided exercise for some ten years; what is then created in the 
workshop…will be fit to go out into the world.”1  
 
                                     
1  Nietzsche and Hollingdale (1996, p. 87)  
IV! !  
 
I think his statements are most widely transferable to writing a dissertation. For in-
stance, I know now that the clumsiness of my first written attempts was not a sign of 
congenital incapacity for the task. Similarly, I am now able to better understand the 
colossal authorial struggles, the multitude of required additions and revisions behind 
the final work.  
However, my mere intrinsic motivation would have been insufficient to write this 
book. That is why I would like to express my appreciation for those who gave me the 
opportunity and supported me throughout the last years. I am much obliged for the 
privilege to pursue my studies in fertile collaboration with my supervisor at the Chair 
of Strategic Management and Business Policy at the University of Zurich, Prof. Dr. 
Egon Franck. He sharpened my economic thinking by sharing his profound 
knowledge in the broader field of institutional economics and his experience in scien-
tific writing. His high degree of confidence in my research projects has been a steady 
source of motivation for me. I am also grateful to my colleagues at the Institute of 
Strategy and Business Economics, not only for valuable comments on various prob-
lems I encountered during my research, but also for the stimulating exchange of ide-
as. Among them, I particularly thank my more experienced colleagues and co-authors 
Dr. Leif Brandes and Dr. Stephan Nüesch for the exciting cooperation. In addition, I 
give thanks to Dr. Rudolf-Carl Meiler and the ThyssenKrupp Steel AG for the trust in 
my abilities and the financial support of my work. Finally, I thank my parents, who 
actually deserve the lion share of my gratitude for their continuous, unconditional 
support throughout the last 28 years.  
 
 
Zurich, August 2010        Jan Pieper 
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1 Introduction 
Every profit-oriented organization attempts to efficiently combine and process 
input factors in order to sell the final product at the highest price possible. An im-
portant aspect, which conventional economic thinking occasionally neglects is the 
fundamental difference between labor and all other input factors. A business can 
simply substitute coal with natural gas, switch off a prohibitively expensive pro-
duction line, or reallocate its available assets. Employees, in contrast, react to giv-
en incentives, suffer from unfavorable working conditions, and potentially protest 
against them. Their behavior is largely driven by emotions, beliefs, and subjective 
perceptions. Subsequent frictions between the economic imperative to realize a 
profit and the human imperative to strive for financial security, respect, and tenure 
are hardly avoidable. Eventually, the economic one must prevail due to the very 
logic of the commercial system. However, this does not necessarily imply that 
employees’ economic and psychological well-being is merely incidental. A better 
understanding of the complexity of human behavior in work contexts can and 
should help shaping employee-employer relationships, which are not unilaterally 
exploitative but enduringly mutually beneficial.  
This relatively young research field can be subsumed under the term personnel 
economics. It benefits from partly competitive and partly cooperative, but eventu-
ally fruitful debates between different social sciences that study all kinds of man-
agement issues related to the employment relationship.  
The key part of the economic approach is to focus on how the environmental 
variables (e.g., resources, information, incentives, constraints, decisions) affect the 
outcome. The rigorous and strictly analytical mainstream economic theory (e.g., 
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theory of production, agency theory, contract theory) typically generates a state-
ment of one or more important tradeoffs between costs and benefits that must be 
balanced. Associated properties like (over-)simplified assumptions and a high lev-
el of abstraction can be mitigated by incorporating more applied research from 
social and organizational psychology. These research fields also investigate envi-
ronmental variables, but focus rather on their impact on human behavior. Consid-
ering the relation between human behavior and the generation of economically 
relevant output, potential complementarities between both perspectives are obvi-
ous.  
As the title of this book suggests, I narrow the focus within this broad frame-
work on the increasingly relevant subfield of teamwork and team processes in 
organizational contexts. But what precisely is a team in an organizational setting? 
Among a variety of definitions offered, I chose one by Cohen and Bailey (1997) 
because it embraces all aspects I consider relevant for my elaborations: „A (work) 
team is a collection of individuals who are interdependent in their tasks, who share 
responsibility for outcomes, who see themselves and who are seen by others as an 
intact social entity embedded in one or more larger social systems (for example, 
business unit or the corporation), and who manage their relationships across or-
ganizational boundaries“ (p. 241).2 
Teams are particularly interesting for investigation because their use as a key 
element of the organizational architecture has expanded dramatically within the 
last decades in response to competitive challenges (Parker, 1993; Smith, 1997; 
Rock and Pratt, 2002). Individuals working together in a cooperative manner to 
attain shared goals usually achieve something beyond the capabilities of individu-
als working alone (Kozlowski and Bell, 2003). The specialization of tasks and the 
division of work as traditional economic explanations may be suitable when ac-
                                     
2  I will use the words “team” and “group” interchangeably, although I more frequently use the term “team”. 
The management literature seems to prefer the term “team” (e.g., self-managing teams, project teams, and 
team effectiveness), whereas the word “group” is more commonly used in the academic literature that is 
influenced by social psychological research (e.g., group cohesion, group dynamics, and group effective-
ness).  
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tivities are stable and predictable, but the contemporary organization is forced to 
respond ever more quickly and adaptively to shifting circumstances. Such situa-
tions can only be mastered by combining diverse but collaboratively related com-
petencies, skills, knowledge, and experiences (Tjosvold, Johnson, Johnson, and 
Sun, 2003). A better understanding of the underlying team processes will enable 
organizations to retool human resource systems and managers to select, develop, 
and reward personnel for effective teamwork.  
In this book, I attempt to contribute to the literature on teams in organizational 
contexts by addressing three specific issues that currently challenge scholars. De-
spite a considerable degree of coherence, they are not based on each other and 
their related literatures are largely independent. Thus, the interested reader is free 
to self-select the preferred sequence of chapter 2, 3, and 4. In the following, I will 
briefly outline the basic background information, the resultant motivation for each 
research question, and my main contributions. 
 
In chapter 2 “Team Specific Human Capital as a Source of Superior Team Per-
formance”, I empirically investigate the performance effect of team-specific hu-
man capital in highly interactive teams. A team’s stock of specific human capital 
refers to its members’ shared experience in working together. In a mutual learn-
ing-by-doing process, the team improves its ability to synchronize individual ac-
tions according to each member’s responsibility. As the acquired skills are largely 
implicit and non-codifiable, I discuss whether team-specific human capital consti-
tutes a critical resource for achieving a sustained competitive advantage according 
to the tenets of the resource-based view (Barney, 1991). The idea of typical learn-
ing functions suggests that within-team cooperation cannot infinitely improve as 
the stock of team-specific human capital increases. A newly composed team ini-
tially possesses a large potential for learning-based improvements, but the attain-
ment of such improvements corresponds to a reduction of the remaining learning 
potential (see Yelle, 1979; Dutton and Thomas, 1984 for reviews). I, therefore, 
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hypothesize that a team’s stock of specific human capital positively affects team 
performance, but at diminishing rates. 
The difficulty of finding proxy variables that appropriately represent unobserv-
able resources has hitherto hampered empirical testing (Godfrey and Hill, 1995; 
Hoskisson, Hitt, Wan, and Yiu, 1999). In order to test my hypotheses, I make use 
of a large panel data set of teams appearing in the highest German soccer league, 
the Bundesliga. Contrary to many other industries, the sports business is an ideal 
labor market laboratory. Accurate measures of individual and team performance 
are easily available and hypotheses may be tested in relatively controlled field 
environments. Competing teams tend to have similar organizational structures and 
pursue similar or identical objectives (Koning, 2003). I argue that soccer in partic-
ular offers a well-suited platform for addressing my research question because the 
output of a soccer team (i.e., the match result) is clearly driven by the interaction 
of its members’ conjunctive tasks. Within specialized but relatively flexible tacti-
cal roles, the players’ ability to interact almost intuitively is required to execute 
their collaboration with precision.  
Holding a team’s stock of general human capital (i.e., playing talent) and other 
potential drivers constant, I find support for my prediction. Implications concern-
ing investment decisions into human capital as well as the transferability of my 
findings to other contexts are discussed.  
 
In chapter 3 “How Expectations Affect Managerial Change”, I am also concerned 
with team performance but my focus is rather on team leadership and changes in 
the leader position. More specifically, I empirically investigate the antecedents of 
the decision to terminate a managerial employment.  
Sooner or later, every organization faces the decision whether to dismiss an un-
derperforming manager and hope for a positive shock effect or to prolong his em-
ployment and hope for disappointing results to be only temporary. Due to the un-
questioned economic relevance of the decision, many scholars have been con-
cerned with investigating managerial change and its associated contingencies. The 
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results, however, remain largely contradictory. What scholars consistently empha-
size is the importance of performance expectations. But so far, the problem to ad-
equately specify expectations has only deficiently been solved in empirical stud-
ies. A related drawback of many existing studies is that they are incapable of esti-
mating deviations from expectations because they lack objective and reliable per-
formance data that the managers can be held accountable for.  
I attempt to address these obstacles in order to derive more valid conclusions. 
Like in chapter 2, I choose the domain of soccer matches from the German Bun-
desliga over other industries because of the considerable advantages for empirical 
investigations. Thus, I consider the coach of a professional sports team to be the 
analogy of a manager in a firm. My innovative specification of performance ex-
pectations is based on supplementary data on betting odds. These prediction mar-
ket prices are continuously updated and aggregate all relevant information availa-
ble until shortly before the match (e.g., relative playing strength, relative coaching 
quality, season aspirations, momentum effects, unforeseen player injuries). More-
over, a large public interest in the clubs’ personnel decisions and the correspond-
ing media coverage facilitate an accurate distinction between voluntary and invol-
untary dismissals. 
Following prospect theory, which predicts how people choose between alterna-
tives that involve risk (Kahneman and Tversky, 1979), I hypothesize that (i) the 
probability of a coach dismissal increases with expectations, even after controlling 
for the actual performance of the team and (ii) that coaches are more likely to be 
fired if they fall short of expectations, compared to peers with equal performance 
who meet or beat expectations. Holding other potential drivers constant, I find 
supportive evidence for both hypotheses. Based on my conclusion that expecta-
tions affect managerial change even beyond the actual performance, I derive prac-
tical recommendations and make some suggestions for future research.  
 
Chapter 4 “Motives for Social Identity Processes in Organizations” is a conceptual 
work in which I try to challenge conventional wisdom about the motives for social 
identity processes in organizational contexts. Social identity as a sense of self, 
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derived from membership in social groups, helps people to navigate their social 
lives, work-wise or other. There are all kinds of social groups (e.g., family, 
friends, neighbors, sport teams, music bands, political parties, religious communi-
ties), which differ by the degree to which group members interact with one anoth-
er, the group’s importance to its members, the extent to which members share out-
comes and common goals, and their similarity to each other (Lickel et al., 2000). 
Within the portfolio of social identities, the workplace plays a highly constitutive 
role in the evaluation of self and others. This is revealed, for instance, in the com-
monness to ask new acquaintances: “What do you do for a living?” And for two 
basic reasons this is hardly surprising. First, most people spend a major part of 
their lifetime at work. Second, most working people do not ply on their trade in 
isolation but rather as part of a team with interdependent tasks and shared respon-
sibility for outcomes.  
Social identity theory has been employed in many social sciences to account for 
collective goals and joint concerns, but also to explain inter-group behavior. For 
the investigation of social behavior in organizational settings, the theory is particu-
larly suited because organizations are internally structured groups, which are lo-
cated in complex networks of inter-group relations that are characterized by pow-
er, status, and prestige differentials (Hogg and Terry, 2000).  
The presently limited explanatory power of respective studies, however, largely 
stems from their too narrow focus of on the human motive to affiliate with groups 
that are distinctive and positively valued in order to enhance self-esteem (i.e., the 
self-esteem hypothesis).  
My aim is to advance the understanding of social identity processes in organi-
zational settings by incorporating significant theoretical developments from more 
recent, predominately psychological research on another central motive, namely 
the need to reduce uncertainty about one’s social identity. 
I provide a substantiated and comprehensive discussion on the relationship be-
tween both motives and reveal that the need for uncertainty reduction is more fun-
damental. The reduction of uncertainty about self can be considered prerequisite 
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for the logically subsequent pursuit of self-esteem. Thus, I expect both motives for 
social identity processes to be sequentially interrelated. Particularly in highly 
structured social environments like organizations, the need for self-esteem is sub-
ject to a set of limitations. Moreover, I show that both motives differ substantially 
in terms of their conditions for activation and their motivational consequences.  
My conceptual improvement allows me to explain largely inconsistent and un-
reliable empirical evidence on the self-esteem hypothesis (e.g., Abrams and Hogg, 
1988; Hogg and Abrams, 1990, 1993; Rubin and Hewstone, 1998).  
In a subsequent step, I apply my extended theoretical framework to gain further 
insight in the performance effects of different contextual factors in organizational 
design, comprising relative-pay schemes, internal labor markets, tacit knowledge 
integration, and team-level diversity. In order to help frame future research direc-
tions in the study of social identity processes and social behavior in organizational 
context, I derive a variety of more or less specific, but testable, propositions. Addi-
tionally, I point out concrete research avenues that are most promising to benefit 
from my approach. 
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2 Specific Human Capital as a Source of Superior Team 
Performance3 
2.1 Introduction 
The resource-based view of the firm proposes that superior performance can be 
explained by differentials in the endowment of valuable and rare resources. A pos-
itive competitive outcome can be sustained as long as both adequate substitutes 
are not available and isolating mechanisms protect critical resources from imita-
tion (Rumelt, 1987; Barney, 1991). These resources can be both tangible and in-
tangible assets that a firm controls. However, in dynamic and competitive envi-
ronments that characterize many markets (Bettis and Hitt, 1995), intangible re-
sources are more likely to make a persistent competitive advantage possible (Mil-
ler and Shamsie, 1996). According to Barney (1986), an effective isolating mech-
anism of intangible resources often stems from their inability to be transferred 
through the market mechanism. More generally, Reed and DeFillippi (1990) argue 
that the height of barriers to imitation is contingent upon the extent to which the 
critical resource is observable. Unobservable resources are tacit, diffused through-
out the organization, or socially embedded. In particular, organizational routines 
are described by these characteristics (Nelson and Winter, 1982; Reed and DeFil-
lippi, 1990). As it is impossible to empirically capture an unobservable resource 
(Godfrey and Hill, 1995) strategy researchers are forced to employ proxy variables 
                                     
3   A revised version of this chapter was published in Franck, E., Nüesch, S., and Pieper, J. (2011). Specific 
human capital as a source of superior team performance. Schmalenbach Business Review, 63, 376-392. 
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that may represent the underlying constructs in a more or less appropriate way. 
The difficulty of finding good proxies for critical resources has hitherto hampered 
the empirical testing of hypotheses proposed by scholars of the resource-based 
view (Godfrey and Hill, 1995; Hoskisson, Hitt, Wan, and Yiu, 1999). 
In this chapter, I empirically investigate the question of whether a team’s 
shared experience, i.e., its stock of team-specific human capital, as an intangible 
and unobservable resource, positively affects team output. Scholars who have at-
tempted to quantify specific human capital have used measures such as tenure 
(e.g., Sandell and Shapiro, 1980; Berman, Down, and Hill, 2002) or qualitative 
survey data about various organizational factors (e.g., Hansen and Wernerfelt, 
1989). We, in contrast, measure team-specific human capital by the actual number 
of deployments for the current team in a competitive context. I argue that my 
proxy measure better reflects the members’ cumulative experience in cooperating 
than does pure tenure. Unlike other papers, such as Berman et al. (2002), I explic-
itly distinguish between the separate effects of specific and general human capital 
on performance. As a proxy measure for the team’s stock of general human capi-
tal, I use estimates of the team members’ market potential that are primarily driven 
by general components of human capital. Using panel data of 25 different soccer 
teams in the German Bundesliga, with a total of 3,672 match observations, my 
empirical analysis is based on a larger sample than that used by any other related 
study. Thus, I believe that this study will make a unique contribution to the empir-
ical literature relating specific human capital to team performance.  
 
 
2.2 Conceptual Framework and Hypotheses 
In the following section, I first examine whether team-specific human capital qual-
ifies as a critical resource for achieving a sustained competitive advantage. Ac-
cording to the resource-based view, a critical resource must add value to the firm, 
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it must be rare, it must be inimitable and it must not be substitutable by an alterna-
tive resource (Barney, 1991). Here, I discuss the four criteria individually, in or-
der. I then refer to learning effects and hence infer my hypothesis about a curvilin-
ear relationship between a team’s stock of team-specific human capital and team 
performance. As team members accumulate experience in working together, the 
team’s stock of team-specific human capital increases. Although this asset is valu-
able because it improves the team’s interaction quality and, thus, its success, its 
accumulation is subject to diminishing returns. In order to gain further insight into 
the relevance of within-team learning processes, I also investigate the effect of the 
heterogeneity concerning team-specific human capital on team performance. 
Moreover, I try to shed some light on the moderating effect of the team leader’s 
team-specific human capital. 
 
 
2.2.1 Is Specific Human Capital Valuable? 
Following Becker (1964), the human capital literature often distinguishes between 
specific and general human capital. Specific human capital refers to skills, experi-
ences, and knowledge that are useful only to a single employer or industry, where-
as general human capital (such as literacy) is freely transferable because it is use-
ful to several employers. In view of this distinction, it has to be considered that 
purely general and purely specific human capital merely constitute theoretical 
poles on a continuum that allows for any mixed form in between (Thurow, 1970). 
Williamson (1985), when remarking on human asset specificity, notes that it gen-
erates a quasi-rent. Generally, a quasi-rent refers to the difference between the 
productivity in the current deployment and the second-best alternative. Thus, the 
degree of specificity corresponds to the scale of the quasi-rent. In the case of pure-
ly general human capital, there is no quasi-rent at all. According to Williamson 
(1975), the main reason why the value of specific human capital is lost when the 
employer changes is that its components are idiosyncratic. Both Becker (1962) 
Specific Human Capital  11 
   
and Williamson (1975) emphasize that idiosyncrasies depend on the duration of 
the transaction relationship because they are acquired in a continuous learning-by-
doing process. In a team context, where each member’s specific human capital is 
only valuable to the current team, this implies that, ceteris paribus, the utility of 
this asset depends on the stability of the workforce, i.e., the team members’ tenure 
(Berman, Down, and Hill, 2002). Alchian (1982) considers the perfect immobility 
of specific human capital to be the main reason for stable employer-employee re-
lationships and even for the existence of firms. 
However, the logic of specificity does not necessarily imply a positive net val-
ue. The underlying calculus is typically an investment decision. A profit-
maximizing decision maker will only invest in the accumulation of specific human 
capital as long as the expected profits induced by the investment more than com-
pensate for the accompanying costs, discounted to the present value (Franz, 1996). 
Some work in the area of utility analysis provides both a theoretical foundation 
and techniques for empirically investigating increases in value due to human capi-
tal, but this work does not distinguish between general and specific human capital 
(Schmidt, Hunter, and Pearlman, 1979; Boudreau, 1983; Cascio and Ramos, 
1986). This body of literature strongly argues that higher-quality human resources 
add value to firms.  
A few studies have attempted to measurably distinguish between general and 
specific human capital in order to isolate their respective effects, despite Blaug’s 
(1976) claim that such a distinction is all but impossible. Sandell and Shapiro 
(1980) investigated the impact that young women's ex ante preferences for future 
labor force attachment have on their human capital accumulation and pay. The 
authors used years of labor market experience as a proxy variable for general hu-
man capital and years of tenure with the current employer as a proxy variable for 
specific human capital. They determined that continuing gender differentials in job 
tenure and in cumulative work experience explain a large part of the gender differ-
ential in earnings and that women’s relative earnings increase when their work 
experience and job tenure increase. Unfortunately, productivity effects were not 
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directly investigated. However, the combined effects of general and specific train-
ing as a major determinant of wages and wage growth among young women indi-
cate at least a partial productivity increase, as wage growth cannot be completely 
explained by seniority. 
In their study on the impact of shared experience on the performance of basket-
ball teams, Berman, Down, and Hill (2002) used a similar conceptualization for 
their independent variable. Tenure, as measured by a weighted average of prior 
seasons for the current team, was found to be a highly significant determinant of 
team performance. In order to control for general player quality, the authors use 
the team members’ average draft position.  
Hansen and Wernerfelt (1989) investigated the relative explanatory power of 
economic and organizational factors in explaining inter-firm differences in profit 
rates. As a proxy for firm-specific resources, they utilized a questionnaire (Survey 
of Organizations, SOO) that captures many dimensions of organizational factors 
such as decision-making practices, goal emphasis, and job design as well as the 
characteristics of communication flow, the emphasis on human resources, and the 
organization of work. Their findings show that industry explains 19 percent of the 
variance in profit rates but that organizational characteristics, including specific 
human capital, are about twice as important. Based on these arguments and find-
ings, specific human capital can reasonably be assumed to be a valuable resource. 
But is specific human capital also a rare resource? 
 
 
2.2.2 Is Specific Human Capital Rare? 
Generally, I agree with Wright, McMahan, and McWilliams (1994), who argue 
that if output depends at least to a certain extent on human capital, which allows 
for variance in individual contributions, then these skills should be normally dis-
tributed in the population. Hence, high-quality human resources should be rare. 
Moreover, both general and specific human capital are characterized by the fact 
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that their accumulation is costly (at the minimum in terms of time), but only the 
former is available through the market mechanism. In other words, there is by def-
inition no supply of specific human capital beyond the internal labor market, alt-
hough there should be demand, as specific human capital adds value to the firm. 
These properties support the description of specific human capital as rare.  
 
 
2.2.3 Is Specific Human Capital Inimitable? 
Given that specific human capital is valuable and rare, is it also inimitable? If a 
competitive advantage that stems from the accumulation of specific human capital 
is easily imitated, then it is not possible to sustain superior performance. In order 
to imitate, competitors must first be able to precisely identify the source of com-
petitive advantage. They then must be able to copy both the critical components of 
the specific human capital and the circumstances under which these work. The 
specific human capital generated in a continuous learning-by-doing-process is 
unlikely to be imitated because it is to a large extent implicit (Doeringer and Piore, 
1971; Franck, 1995). Through cumulative experience, certain processes become so 
internalized that their successful execution happens unconsciously and cannot be 
verbally explained. The implicit character of specific human capital makes it all 
but impossible to formalize (Lippman and Rumelt, 1982) and thus impedes imita-
tion. 
This is true for individual employees and even more so for highly interactive 
teams performing a common task. A team’s stock of specific human capital con-
sists of a socially complex interaction of implicit and non-codifiable skills. As this 
asset increases through a mutual learning-by-doing process, the team improves its 
ability to synchronize individual actions according to each member’s responsibil-
ity. In this respect, I follow Weick and Robert’s (1993) notion of the collective 
mind representing the specific human capital that is collectively held by a group of 
individuals. This asset is diffused among the team members, of whom each only 
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has access to a part of the overall stock of the team-specific human capital. Thus, 
it is impossible to dissect the complexity of interactions in order to isolate individ-
ual contributions to team output (Wright, McMahan, and McWilliams 1994). The 
fact that in team production, the total output typically exceeds the sum of its mem-
bers’ inputs further complicates the problem of identifying critical resources (Al-
chian and Demsetz, 1972). Even in team production processes that are openly ob-
servable to externals, there is causal ambiguity concerning the reasons for superior 
performance (Reed and DeFillippi, 1990; Powell, Lovallo, and Caringal, 2006).  
At the extreme, luring away the entire workforce of a competitor seems to be a 
way to circumvent both the causal ambiguity and the immobility of specific hu-
man capital, but this approach neglects that a team’s effectiveness may be tightly 
coupled to other resources of the firm (Wright, McMahan, and McWilliams, 
1994). A team’s effectiveness may further depend on relationships with other 
teams or on unique historical circumstances (Alchian and Demsetz, 1972). Thus, 
specific human capital is safe from being imitated. In all likelihood, competitors 
are neither able to identify the source of competitive advantage nor able to copy 
the critical components of the specific human capital and the circumstances under 
which these work. 
Porter (1985), however, argues that “… barriers to imitation are never insur-
mountable.” If other teams could identify the source of competitive advantage and 
imitate it, then the barriers to imitation would still be contingent on the cost of 
imitation. In the case of specific human capital, imitation is costly, especially in 
terms of time. Therefore, scholars of the resource-based view would propose that 
high performance could be sustained for some time at least. 
 
 
2.2.4 Is Specific Human Capital Non-Substitutable? 
Finally, specific human capital must not be substitutable if it is to be a critical re-
source of sustained competitive advantage. To the extent that other resources are 
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able to offset performance increments attributable to specific human capital, spe-
cific human capital by itself does not have the potential to give rise to sustained 
competitive advantage. In order to address the question of substitutability, it is 
important to note that the only resources that can substitute for specific human 
capital are, in their own right, valuable, rare, inimitable and non-substitutable. 
Accordingly, the benefits from a team’s stock of specific human capital can indeed 
be eroded by other resources such as, for example, a competing team’s additional 
investment in its stock of general human capital or its application of a superior 
technology. However, neither is capable of consistently substituting for specific 
human capital because these resources are available for purchase in the market-
place. Their free imitability prevents them from acting as a source of sustained 
competitive advantage (Wright, McMahan, and McWilliams, 1994). Hence, a 
team’s stock of specific human capital is unlikely to be substituted because the 
requirements for a substitutive resource are difficult to meet. 
In summary, a team’s stock of specific human capital is valuable and rare, can-
not be imitated, and is unlikely to be substituted. Based on these observations, I 
assume a positive relationship between a team’s stock of team-specific human 
capital and team performance.  
 
Hypothesis 1a: 
 
There is a positive relationship between a team’s stock of team-specific human 
capital and team performance.    
 
 
2.2.5 Learning Effects 
The learning-curve phenomenon is well known. As an organization gains experi-
ence, organizational performance improves at a decreasing rate. Scholars have 
extensively researched learning curves, and managers have often used learning 
16  Specific Human Capital 
 
 
curves for planning purposes (Argote, 1999).  
When members of a team accumulate specific human capital in a constant 
learning process that facilitates their interaction, several theoretical arguments 
suggest that these learning effects are subject to diminishing returns. Over the last 
50 years, the phenomenon of diminishing returns as a consequence of typical 
learning effects has also been empirically well documented (see Yelle, 1979 and 
Dutton and Thomas, 1984 for reviews). The main argument is that there is a limit 
to the returns of team-specific human capital and that this limit is determined by 
the production technology. Team cooperation cannot infinitely improve as the 
stock of team-specific human capital increases. Hence, there are typical learning-
curve effects. A newly composed team initially possesses a large potential for 
learning-based improvements, but the attainment of such improvements corre-
sponds to a reduction of the remaining learning potential. Studying learning ef-
fects in 50 R&D teams, Katz (1982) found the relationship between shared team 
experience and team performance, as hypothesized, to be concave in shape. He 
concluded that  
 
“…the upward slope in performance probably reflects the positive effects 
of learning and team building as new project members contribute fresh 
ideas and approaches while also developing a better understanding of 
each other’s capabilities, of the technologies involved, and of their work-
ing relationships. Such positive effects, however, appear to taper off for 
teams whose members have continued to work together for a long period 
of time.” (p. 98).  
 
In line with theoretical arguments and empirical findings, I assume the relation-
ship between a team’s stock of team-specific human capital and team performance 
not to be linear but concave in shape.  
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Hypothesis 1b: 
 
The relationship between team-specific human capital and team performance is 
subject to diminishing returns. The positive performance effects of team-specific 
human capital will decline as shared experience grows. 
 
 
2.2.6 Heterogeneity of Team-Specific Human Capital 
Although a team’s total stock of team-specific human capital is central to my theo-
retical predictions, the composition of team members concerning their individual 
working experience with the team may also matter. One viewpoint is that the 
team’s composition requires continuity for mutual learning processes to improve 
interaction and to induce positive returns, especially if the successful accomplish-
ment of complex team tasks requires complementary skills. In performing con-
junctive tasks, one member’s lack of certain skills cannot be compensated by other 
team members’ superior skills (Kremer, 1993). This argument suggests that a team 
should be rather homogeneous in terms of their members’ tenure. The heteroge-
neity of team-specific human capital within a team may also create more distant 
relationships between team members that impair the exchange of information and 
thus the quality of interaction (Ancona and Caldwell, 1992). In some instances, 
heterogeneity may create distrust, as widely dissimilar group members may have 
different vocabularies, paradigms, and even objectives. 
Another viewpoint is that homogeneity may be counterproductive if there are 
too many status-seeking members because the team’s (implicit) hierarchy is insuf-
ficiently differentiated (Overbeck, Correll, and Park, 2005). It can be fruitful to 
expose team members to new perspectives. From this viewpoint, the most success-
ful teams may consist of a combination of experienced members who possess a lot 
of team-specific human capital and new members who supply fresh ideas. Also, 
the introduction of new team members may circumvent free-riding tendencies and 
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productively increase competition within the team (e.g., Alchian and Demsetz, 
1972; Holmstrom, 1982).  
In line with these contradictory perspectives, empirical findings have been 
mixed. Some studies have shown a negative relationship between tenure heteroge-
neity and different performance measures, such as innovation (O'Reilly and Flatt, 
1989), adaptive change in a sample of electronics firms (O'Reilly, Snyder, and 
Boothe, 1993), and informal communication within the team (Smith et al., 1994). 
Berman, Down, and Hill (2002) found no significant relationship between tenure 
heterogeneity and team performance in professional basketball. Using data from 
the airline industry, Hambrick, Cho, and Chen (1996) found evidence for a posi-
tive link between tenure heterogeneity and two measures of performance. Despite 
the inconsistent theoretical predictions and inconclusive empirical results, I expect 
a higher stock of shared experience to be beneficial given the high degree of team 
members’ interactivity in the production process of a soccer match. Hence, I as-
sume heterogeneity of team-specific human capital to have a negative effect on 
team performance.  
 
Hypothesis 2: 
 
There is a negative relationship between the heterogeneity of team-specific human 
capital and team performance.    
 
 
2.2.7 Team Leader’s Team-Specific Human Capital 
Beyond the compositional aspects of the team itself, the most obvious moderators 
of any team’s performance are its leadership and changes in leadership. In their 
review of executive succession research, Kesner and Sebora (1994) note: “… few 
if any transitions at other organizational levels have as profound an effect either 
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inside or outside the firm.” (p. 357). Aldrich and Pfeffer (1976) suggest hiring 
executives from other organizations as a means of facilitating the transfer of skills 
and technology across organizations. Generally, the effect of leadership (dis-) con-
tinuity on organizational performance has been widely researched, but conclusions 
are mixed. For example, Lieberson and O’Connor (1972) investigated the relation-
ship between changes in the chief executive officer (CEO) position and subse-
quent developments in company performance indicators such as sales and profits. 
They found little evidence of any relationship. Weiner and Mahoney (1981) found 
stronger evidence of a leadership effect. Also, Virany, Tushman, and Romanelli 
(1992) drew positive conclusions about the performance effects of changes in the 
CEO position in their study of US computer equipment manufacturers. Denis and 
Denis (1995) found that forced resignations of top managers tend to be preceded 
by large declines in operating performance and followed by strong recoveries. 
Normal retirements tend to be followed by more moderate improvements on aver-
age. Carroll (1984), on the contrary, found that a managerial change among U.S. 
newspaper publishers was typically followed by a decline in performance. How-
ever, empirical investigations of the effect of leadership (dis-) continuity on per-
formance face several intricacies. According to Koning (2003), there are three 
difficulties. The first difficulty is the measurement of performance. The more 
complex the structure of a firm, the more difficult it is to isolate a single person’s 
impact on performance. Also, the measurement of performance may be complicat-
ed because the interests of the firm’s decision makers are not necessarily aligned 
but may, on the contrary, diverge substantially. The second difficulty is observing 
if and when a manager is fired, as firms usually have no particular interest in pub-
licly disclosing information about internal hiring and firing decisions. The last 
difficulty is due to the fact that a managerial change is typically accompanied by 
simultaneous changes, which impede an investigation under the ceteris paribus 
condition. It is all but impossible to assess what part of the change in performance 
can be attributed to the change in the leadership position and what part stems from 
the change in the conditions faced by the old and the new manager, respectively. 
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These obstacles give rise to a strong tradition of research based on team sports 
data within the empirical literature (see Audas, Dobson, and Goddard, 2002 for a 
review). The position in sports analogous to an executive is a head coach.  
Eitzen and Yetman (1972), for example, investigated the impact of changes in 
the coaching position in college basketball teams. Based on their data, the authors 
concluded that coaching shifts do not affect performance. However, they found 
that the relationship between coaching tenure and team performance is suggestive 
of a learning curve: as coaching tenure increases, team success increases, but at 
diminishing rates. Porter and Scully (1982) also found a positive correlation be-
tween a coach’s tenure and team performance in professional baseball that is com-
parable to that of an individual star player. Scully (1995) provides further evidence 
of a significantly positive relationship between a coach’s tenure and team perfor-
mance for baseball, basketball and American football.  
In line with these findings, I argue that a team leader’s team-specific human 
capital, i.e., his experience in leading the same team, positively affects team per-
formance. However, I also expect teams with a higher stock of team-specific hu-
man capital to profit less from a leader with a lot of team-specific human capital 
than do teams with a lower stock of team-specific human capital. In other words, 
maintaining continuity of team leadership on teams with low levels of team-
specific human capital is important to allow for learning processes to rapidly pro-
gress among team members. In sum, I expect a team leader’s team-specific human 
capital to interact non-monotonically with his team’s stock of team-specific hu-
man capital to affect team performance. 
 
Hypothesis 3: 
 
The team leader’s team-specific human capital interacts non-monotonically with 
his team’s team-specific human capital to affect cooperation. The positive effects 
of a team leader’s team-specific human capital on team performance will decline 
as the team’s stock of team-specific human capital grows. 
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2.3 Methodology 
In order to test my hypotheses, I studied a large panel of match-level data of teams 
appearing in the highest German soccer league, the Bundesliga. I agree with Kahn 
(2000) that the sports business is an ideal labor market laboratory. Due to the fre-
quency and regularity of athletic events, large and reliable data sets that contain 
accurate measures of individual and team performance are easily available. Unlike 
in many other industries, hypotheses may be tested in relatively controlled field 
environments. Competing teams in any sport tend to have similar organizational 
structures and pursue similar or identical objectives, and the production process is 
clearly defined by a detailed catalogue of rules of the game, which are enforced by 
independent referees (Koning, 2003). I argue that soccer in particular offers an 
exceptionally well-suited platform for investigating the impact of a team’s stock of 
specific knowledge on team performance.  
Unlike sports in which team productivity depends on disjunctive tasks (e.g., 
baseball), the output of a soccer team is clearly driven by the interaction of its 
members’ conjunctive tasks. An offense player will be unlikely to score if his 
teammates do not support him with offensive passes. Similarly, a defender can 
hardly avoid conceding a goal if his team’s midfielders constantly give misplaced 
passes (Franck and Nüesch, forthcoming). Also, the different tactical positions are 
not as narrowly circumscribed as, e.g., in baseball or American football (Katz, 
2001). This means that in soccer, each player principally acts according to the re-
sponsibilities of his tactical position and predominantly interacts with players of 
adjacent tactical positions. However, depending on the situation, any player can 
get involved in offense or defense and may interact with any other team member.4  
The required interaction of specialized but relatively flexible tactical roles, in 
combination with the speed of the game, makes team-specific human capital criti-
                                     
4  The goalkeeper constitutes an exception because he is subject to a set of additional rules. As the only 
player who is allowed to use his hands within his own penalty area he very rarely leaves his tactical posi-
tion.  
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cal in professional soccer. When there is no time to verbally coordinate individual 
actions, the players’ ability to cooperate almost intuitively is required to execute 
their collaboration with precision. This becomes obvious if one thinks of a player 
who wants to pass the ball to a teammate. The passing player has to anticipate 
where the receiving player is going to run, and equally, the latter has to predict 
where the ball is going to be passed. Simultaneously, both players have to perceive 
and even anticipate their opponents’ actions in order to adapt to them. In a profes-
sional soccer match, a countless number of these types of actions must be con-
ducted very quickly in order to be successful, leaving little time for explicit com-
munication. The high interaction level requires that teammates have shared expe-
rience in playing as a team. Although in professional soccer, the final team per-
formance occurs in front of thousands of spectators in the venue and is televised, 
the implicit character of team-specific human capital still creates causal ambiguity, 
which means that it is all but impossible for both the team and its rival to deter-
mine what exactly generates superior performance (Reed and DeFillippi, 1990; 
Powell, Lovallo, and Caringal, 2006). Furthermore, the pool of potential substitute 
resources for team-specific human capital is limited because all competing teams 
use identical technologies, as defined by the precise specification of the produc-
tion process of a soccer match.  
 
 
2.3.1 Data 
The sample consists of a panel of 1,177 players whom I recorded in 50,412 player-
match-observations from the 2001/02 season to the 2006/07 season of the highest 
German soccer league, the Bundesliga. From the player-match data set, I aggre-
gate the team’s average in team-specific human capital and other team composi-
tion variables for 3,672 team-match-observations. In each season, which begins in 
August and runs through May of the following year, each of the league’s 18 teams 
plays each other team in one home and one away match, resulting in 34 matches 
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per team and season. Due to the relegation of the three lowest-ranked teams and 
the promotion of the three highest-ranked teams of the second Bundesliga at the 
end of the season, my study sample comprises 25 teams. Most of the data I em-
ploy in this study are freely available on the Internet (www.fussballdaten.de). The 
players’ market values were collected from special editions of Kicker, the most 
prominent German soccer magazine. All teams and their respective presence in the 
Bundesliga within the timeframe of the data set are listed in Appendix A. 
 
 
2.3.2 Dependent Variable  
Team performance. In a soccer match, team performance is always a relative out-
come that reflects the playing quality of one team in comparison to the opposing 
team. Each team’s output is easily measurable because the team that scores more 
goals than its opponent wins three points, and the losing team gets zero points. If 
both teams score an equal number of goals, then the match is counted a draw and 
both teams get one point. Within a league, teams are ranked according to the sum 
of their points won. In cases where two or more teams possess an equal number of 
points, their relative positions are determined by the difference between goals 
scored and goals received. Hence, each team has an incentive not only to win the 
match but also to do so with a goal difference that is as large as possible. Because 
my data set allows investigation on the team-match level, I consider the goal dif-
ference the best way to reflect the presence of a competitive advantage.  
 
 
2.3.3 Independent Variables 
Team-specific human capital. It is difficult to accurately distinguish between spe-
cific and general human capital because both are simultaneously developed and 
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both can be expected to influence a team’s performance. However, a player’s 
team-specific human capital is clearly expunged the moment he leaves his team, 
whereas he continuously gains experience, as a form of general human capital, 
throughout his entire career, regardless of the number of clubs he plays for. There-
fore, I consider the number of previous appearances in league matches played for 
the current team to be a reasonable proxy of a player’s team-specific human capi-
tal. On the team-match level, I build the average of this measure over all fielded 
players. See the Appendix B for a sample calculation. 
I also include the squared value of the variable to allow for the hypothesized 
concave form of the relationship between team-specific human capital and team 
performance. 
 
Heterogeneity of team-specific human capital. As a proxy variable for a team’s 
heterogeneity in terms of team-specific human capital, I calculate the standard 
deviation of all fielded players’ number of prior appearances for the current team 
on a team-match level. This variable is needed to test hypothesis 2 and to gain 
further insight into the relationship between the heterogeneity of team-specific 
human capital and team performance.  
 
The coach’s team-specific human capital. Changes in a soccer team’s coaching 
position are not unusual and are well publicized due to the high transparency of 
the production process and the large public interest in the clubs’ choice of coach. 
Frick (1998) found that in the German Bundesliga, a head coach’s mean tenure 
amounts to 12.5 months. However, I do not measure the coach’s team-specific 
human capital in terms of time; rather, analogously to my conceptualization of 
team-specific human capital, I measure it by the number of matches coached with 
the current team before the match in question. I expect a positive correlation be-
tween the measures for coaching experience with the team and team performance 
because leadership continuity allows for learning processes to progress among 
team members. In order to test hypothesis 3, that the coach’s experience with the 
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same team interacts non-monotonically with his players’ team-specific human 
capital to affect team performance, I introduce an interaction term of the coach’s 
team-specific human capital with his team’s stock of team-specific human capital. 
 
 
2.3.4 Control Variables 
Difference in general human capital. I control for a team’s stock of general human 
capital because it is open to scrutiny that a newly composed team with virtually no 
specific human capital at all but with a lot of expensive superstars (i.e., a larger 
stock of general human capital) is likely to beat a team that has a great deal of ex-
perience playing together (i.e., a larger stock of team-specific human capital) but 
that is comprised of unknown average players. Thus, a team’s competitive ad-
vantage due to its members’ comparatively larger experience in playing with each 
other can be offset by a competing team’s additional investment in its stock of 
general human capital. However, as discussed above, the benefits gained from 
additional general human capital are not safe from imitation because the services 
of higher-quality players can be bought on the transfer market. 
I argue that a player’s general human capital can be approximated by predicted 
start-of-season market values. In the Bundesliga clubs do not have to publish their 
players’ market values. The Kicker soccer magazine, however, began to publish 
respective proxies in the mid-1990s. These proxies are likely to be consistent be-
cause the market values have been estimated in a systematic manner for several 
years by largely unchanged editorial staff. They have already been used in several 
empirical studies on the German soccer league (see Lehmann and Weigand, 1999; 
Swieter, 2000; Forrest and Simmons, 2002; Hübl and Swieter, 2000; Littkemann 
and Kleist, 2002; Haas, Kocher, and Sutter, 2004; Franck and Nüesch, 2009; 
Franck and Nüesch, forthcoming).  
A player’s performance is not only transparently observable during the match; 
also training sessions are usually open to the public (Franck, 1995). A wide public 
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interest in players' backgrounds and private life works as an additional monitoring 
mechanism and reduces behavior that could adversely affect performance. With 
minimal information asymmetries concerning a player’s capabilities, I expect pre-
dicted market values to adequately comprise all general human capital compo-
nents. As market values represent the price that another team is willing to pay for 
the services of a certain player, market values should accurately reflect that play-
er’s transferable general human capital. Team-specific human capital is not incor-
porated into market values because it is by definition immobile. Forrest and Sim-
mons (2002) show that in European soccer, high market values clearly increase 
field success. 
Following Depken (1999), I use the logarithm of estimated market values as a 
control variable for the team’s stock of general human capital. Market values are 
expressed in 2003 Euros and are adjusted for inflation. Because the match is my 
unit of observation, I can easily take the opposing team’s stock of general human 
capital into account to calculate the teams’ relative advantage. Subsequently, I first 
take the logarithm of each team’s sum of its fielded players’ estimated market val-
ues and then calculate the difference between the opposing teams.  
 
Age. I include a variable for the player’s age in the regression as a proxy variable 
for a player’s experience and general physical condition. The age of each player is 
calculated for each team-match observation by taking the difference between the 
date of the match day and the player’s date of birth. For ease of interpretation, I 
convert this from days to years and then calculate an average for each team-match 
observation. Although it is impossible to make a definite distinction between 
young and old players, age is generally connected with greater experience with the 
game. However, physical abilities such as speed, stamina, and the ability to con-
tinuously recover within short intervals from exhausting performances tend to 
gradually deteriorate from a certain age onwards.5 Simultaneously, the risk of inju-
                                     
5  Frick, Pietzner, and Prinz (2007) found a statistically positive in!uence of player age on the probability of 
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ry increases. Only about 8 percent of all player careers in the Bundesliga from the 
1963/64 season to the 2002/03 season lasted for 10 seasons and more (Frick, 
Pietzner, and Prinz 2007). At the same time, physical abilities constitute a neces-
sary condition for team-specific human capital to induce positive returns. A play-
er’s team-specific human capital can only contribute to his team’s performance as 
long as he is at the same fitness level as his younger teammates. If his physical 
shape drops below a certain threshold level, he will no longer be selected to play 
in the competition team (Lucifora and Simmons 2003). 
As I have argued above, I expect the relationship between a team’s average age 
and its performance to be curvilinear in shape. Therefore, I also include the square 
of the age variable in the model.  
A potential problem with the use of the age variable is that it is likely to co-
vary with the players’ market values. However, I include it in the model because 
the simple aging of players could affect performance beyond the market values. In 
addition, it is important to account for age in the context of this study. Otherwise, 
the simple aging of players would be difficult to reject as the main reason for di-
minishing returns in performance at increasing levels of shared team-specific hu-
man capital.  
 
Age heterogeneity. To generate a measure of age heterogeneity, I calculate the 
standard deviation of the fielded player’s age on a team-match level. The integra-
tion of this control variable is necessary in order to rule out age heterogeneity as 
an alternative explanation for hypothesis 2, in which I predict the heterogeneity of 
team-specific human capital to be negatively related to team performance.  
Home advantage. In order to control for potential home field advantage, I include 
a dummy variable that takes the value 1 in the case of a home match and 0 in the 
case of an away match. Carmichael and Thomas (2005) showed that home field 
                                                                                                   
being eliminated from the Bundesliga while controlling for a series of individual characteristics, position 
dummies, region of origin dummies, and institutional characteristics. In my study sample the quantil Q.9 in 
terms of player age is 32.5 years. 
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factors, e.g., a dominant fan base in the stadium and familiarity effects, positively 
influence the effectiveness of the home team. 
 
Relative suspension time. After receiving a red card, the affected player has to 
leave the field immediately, leaving the team at a numerical disadvantage for the 
rest of the match.6 This disadvantage is not negligible concerning the outcome of 
the match, which was shown by Franck and Nüesch (forthcoming), who analyzed 
the results of 1,530 matches in the Bundesliga. The authors found that red cards 
significantly influence the final score of a match, with a coefficient of -0.287. 
However, a variable that denotes the mere number of received red cards does not 
differentiate in terms of the time that the team has to perform in a numerically 
reduced formation. It makes a difference whether the player is expelled from the 
field in the 1st or in the 90th minute of the match. Equally, it is important whether 
the opposing team is numerically reduced because of red cards as well. If two 
players of opposing teams are simultaneously expelled from the field, then the 
respective disadvantages should cancel each other. Thus, I build the sum of the 
fielded players’ time on pitch for both opposing teams and then calculate the dif-
ference between them.7  
 
Difference in number of substitutions. Despite the fact that in a typical soccer 
                                     
6  Law 12 of the FIFA Laws of the Game lists the categories of misconduct for which a player may be sent 
off. These are: 1. Serious foul play (a violent foul), 2. Violent conduct (any other act of violence), 3. Spit-
ting at anyone, 4. A deliberate handling offense to deny an obvious goal-scoring opportunity by any play-
er other than a goalkeeper in his own penalty area, 5. Committing an offence that denies an opponent an 
obvious goal-scoring opportunity, 6. Using offensive, insulting or abusive language or gestures, 7. Receiv-
ing a second caution (yellow card) in one game (see, for example at:    
www.fifa.com/worldfootball/lawsofthegame.html/). 
 
7  For illustration purposes, consider the following example: Team A plays against team B. In a 90-minute 
match, none of team A’s eleven players receives a red card. This results in a total of 990 minutes on the 
pitch for team A. One player on team B receives a red card in the 40th minute of the match. This results in 
a total of 940 minutes on the pitch for team B. The variable takes the value -50 (= 940 - 990) for team A 
and 50 (= 990 - 940) for team B. 
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match, most teams exploit the maximum of three substitutions,8 Franck and 
Nüesch (2009) still found a positive relationship between the number of substitu-
tions and the match outcome. Thus, I also control for the difference in the number 
of substitutions because this measure takes into account that the two teams’ poten-
tial advantages due to substitutions may offset each other. 
 
 
2.3.5 Analysis and Results 
It is well known that panel data require special econometric modeling in the form 
of either pooled regression or random modeling or fixed-effects modeling. An F-
test following a fixed-effects regression indicates that there are significant team-
level effects (F-statistics: 4.48 and 4.67) implying that pooled OLS would be in-
appropriate. In order to decide whether the team-level effects are random or fixed, 
I performed the Hausman specification test (Hausman, 1978), which compares the 
fixed-effects model with the random-effects model. The results show that team-
level effects would be modeled inadequately by a random-effects model (Chi-
square statistics: 6.33 and 109.39). Furthermore, I use an unbalanced panel due to 
the promotion and relegation of teams in European soccer and the reason for why 
a team gets promoted or relegated (called attrition) is not random. Instead, it is 
likely to be correlated with unobserved team playing strength, which may cause 
biased estimates due to resulting sample selection. This aspect supports the use of 
a fixed-effects approach because fixed-effects analysis allows for the attrition to 
be correlated with the constant unobserved effect (Wooldridge, 2003).9  
 Table 1 presents descriptive statistics and correlations. The mean values for 
goal difference, difference in market values and difference in time spent on the 
                                     
8  In my study sample, teams deploy an average of 13.73 fielded players per match (which corresponds to 
2.73 substitutions per match). 
 
9  See, e.g., Kyriazidou (1997) for a procedure to also account for non-constant selection effects.  
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pitch have to be zero by definition. A correlation above 0.9 is found for the team-
specific human capital measure and its square as well as for the age measure and 
its square with respective variance inflation factors (VIFs) of above 10.10 Despite 
the high correlations, I do not drop the squared terms from the model, as the re-
quirement of unbiased estimates is not necessarily violated. High degrees of corre-
lation between the independent variables are really no different than using a small 
sample size, as the variance of the coefficient estimates increases in both cases, 
which may lead to statistical insignificance (Wooldridge 2003). Additionally, I 
argue that the concerned squared terms should not be dropped from the model 
because theoretical arguments and empirical evidence support my predictions that 
the respective relationships will be concave in shape. Ignoring these non-
linearities would lead to biased estimates. 
 
Table 1: Variables, Descriptive Statistics, and Pearson Correlation Coefficients 
  Variable Mean S.D. 1   2   3   4  5  6  7  8  9 
1 Goal difference 0 1.83            
2 Team-specific HC 61.3 19.15 .13 ***                
3 Team-specific HC squared 4121.8 2638.88 .13 
*** .98 ***              
4 Coach's team-specific HC 70.3 81.58 -.03 
 
.13 *** .12 ***            
5 Difference in general HC 0 0.6679 .33 
*** .45 *** .45 *** .04 *          
6 Age 9946.8 407.34 .01 
 
.14 *** .13 *** -.09 *** -.03 *       
7 Age squared 9.91E+07 8086351 .01 
 
.14 *** .14 *** -.09 *** -.03 * .99 ***      
8 Home advantage 0.5 0.5 .25 *** .02  .01  -.00  .02  .02 .02     
9 Relative suspension time 0 15.04 .22 
*** .01  .01  .01  .02  .04 * .04 * .14 ***  
10 Difference in number of substitutions 0 0.76 .18 
*** .02   .01   .06 *** .07 *** .02   .02   .03   .03 
 
 Note: Significance levels (one-tailed): † 10%, * 5%, ** 1%, *** 0.1%. N = 3672. 
 
                                     
10  A commonly given rule of thumb says that only VIFs above a value of 10 may be a reason of concern 
(see, Neter et al. 1989).  
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Table 2 shows the estimation results from the regression analysis including team 
fixed effects for both competing teams of a match. Seven out of 11 variables are 
significant in predicting the relative outcome of a soccer match, as measured by 
the goal difference. Based on the tenets of the resource-based view of the firm, I 
predicted in hypothesis 1a that team performance is positively affected by the ac-
cumulation of team-specific human capital. I find support for this relationship as 
the proxy variable for a team’s stock of team-specific human capital, measured by 
the team average of prior appearances for the current team significantly increases 
team performance (b = 0.012, p < 0.10). Furthermore, I hypothesized the perfor-
mance increments to be subject to diminishing returns due to typical learning pro-
cesses (hypothesis 1b). The results are suggestive of such a concave relationship 
between a team’s stock of team-specific human capital and team performance, as 
the squared term of the team-specific human capital measure is significantly nega-
tive (b = -0.0001, p < 0.10). Shared experience in working as a team seems to mat-
ter even beyond the positive impacts of general human capital. 
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Table 2: Team Fixed Effects Regression Results 
Variable Coefficient   
Constant -5.3883 
 
(11.2412) 
Team-specific HC .0123   † (0.0082) 
Team-specific HC squared -.00008   † (0.00006) 
Heterogeneity of team-specific HC -.0064  * (0.0026) 
Coach’s team-specific HC -.0012 
 
(0.0018) 
Team-specific HC ! coach’s team-specific HC -5.41E-6 
 
(0.00002) 
Difference in general HC .2119  † (0.1387) 
Age .0008 
 
(0.0023) 
Age squared -3.00E-8 
 
(1.15E-7) 
Age heterogeneity .0001 
 
(0.0001) 
Home advantage .7838  *** (0.074) 
Relative suspension time -.0216  *** (0.0024) 
Difference in number of substitutions .4238  *** (0.049) 
    
Note: The dependent variable is the goal difference of a match. In order to account for potential time effects, 
the model also includes seasonal dummies, which are not reported in the table. Standard errors in parentheses 
are heteroskedasticity robust standard errors clustered at the match-level. Significance tests are one-tailed. 
Significance levels (one-tailed): † 10%, * 5%, ** 1%, *** 0.1%. N = 3672. R2 = 0.26. 
 
 
The data provide strong support for hypothesis 2 (b = -0.006, p < 0.05). Seem-
ingly, team-specific human capital must be equally distributed among the team 
members to achieve its full potential. This finding can be interpreted in line with 
Kremer (1993), who suggested that in performing conjunctive tasks, a team mem-
ber’s lack of certain skills cannot be compensated by other team members’ superi-
or skills. This finding together with the support for hypotheses 1a and 1b implies 
that, all else being equal, teams whose members are, on average, both experienced 
in playing for their current team and homogeneous concerning that experience are 
more successful simply because they are more used to playing together as a team. 
Hypothesis 3, suggesting that a team coach’s team-specific human capital in-
teracts non-monotonically with his players’ team-specific human capital to affect 
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team performance, is not supported by the data. Neither the coach’s number of 
prior games with the current team as a measure for team-specific coaching experi-
ence nor the interaction term between this variable and the team’s stock of team-
specific human capital has a significant effect on team performance.  
Looking at the control variables, I find a positive and statistically significant 
impact of the relative difference between the opposing teams’ logarithmic sum of 
estimated player market values on team-performance (b = 0.212, p < 0.10). This 
result confirms the expectation that a team’s performance in soccer also depends 
on a team’s relative advantage concerning the stock of general human capital. The 
variable mean age and its square are not significantly correlated with team per-
formance. A possible explanation is that a player’s age is already accounted for in 
his estimated market value. Also, the coefficient for age heterogeneity is insignifi-
cant and does not indicate that the team composition concerning the team mem-
bers’ age is critical in explaining team performance. However, the integration of 
this control variable was necessary to rule out age heterogeneity as an alternative 
explanation for hypotheses 2.  
The coefficient for home advantage is highly significant (b = 0.784, p < 0.01). 
This result is in line with Carmichael and Thomas (2005), who showed that home 
field factors positively influence the effectiveness of the home team. All else being 
equal, a team scores approximately 0.8 goals more in a home match than in an 
away match.  
Similarly intuitive is the significantly negative coefficient for relative suspen-
sion time, controlling for numerical disadvantage due to red cards (b = -0.022, p < 
0.01). A team that plays about 46 minutes with fewer fielded players than the op-
posing team receives on average one goal more than it scores.  
Finally, a significant effect is found for the difference in the number of substi-
tutions. As expected, there is a strong positive correlation between the difference 
in the number of substitutions and team performance (b = 0.424, p < 0.01). All 
else being equal, a team that uses one more substitution than its opponent scores 
approximately 0.4 more goals. However, as it is unclear whether the association is 
34  Specific Human Capital 
 
 
causative or correlative, this finding does not provide any guidance to coaches 
regarding how to make use of their substitutions. Substitutions may allow the 
coach to replace temporarily bad performers or exhausted or injured players with 
promising prospects sitting on the bench. Conversely, it is also plausible that the 
leading team has an incentive to substitute an offensive player with a defender in 
order to hinder the opponents’ attempts to catch up.  
 
 
2.4 Discussion and Conclusion 
In this paper, I empirically investigated whether a team’s shared experience, i.e., 
its stock of team-specific human capital, as an intangible and unobservable re-
source, sustainably affects team output. I employed a large panel data set of pro-
fessional soccer teams from the German Bundesliga as an example of highly inter-
active teams, and I used this sample to examine how team-specific human capital 
qualifies as a critical resource for achieving a competitive advantage. According to 
the resource-based view, such a critical resource must add value to the firm, it 
must be rare, it must be inimitable and it must not be substitutable by an alterna-
tive resource (Barney, 1991). Based on these tenets, I hypothesized a positive rela-
tionship between a team’s stock of team-specific human capital and team perfor-
mance. The empirical investigation provides support for this prediction, indicating 
that team members should generally be retained in the team. Furthermore, I am 
able to show that the relationship between team-specific human capital and team 
performance is not linear but concave in shape, which can be convincingly ex-
plained by learning effects.  
Concerning the heterogeneity of a team’s team-specific human capital, I find a 
clearly negative impact on team performance, indicating that team members 
should not only be retained in the team but should also be similarly experienced in 
playing for their current team. These findings support the notion of team-specific 
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human capital as constituting a critical resource according to the resource-based 
view of the firm. As an intangible resource, team-specific human capital is able to 
induce and, at least temporarily, sustain a competitive advantage because it is rela-
tively safe from being imitated by competitors or substituted by another resource.  
I also find that team performance in soccer depends on the relative advantage in 
a team’s stock of general human capital. However, general human capital is freely 
transferable because it is valuable to all teams, whereas the value of team-specific 
human capital is lost when the team is changed (see Williamson, 1984).  
The finding that a player’s specific relationships with teammates matter implies 
that the loss of team-specific human capital in the case of a transfer should be ac-
counted for in any club’s investment decision regarding the engagement of new 
players (Clarke and Madden, 1988; Rosen and Sanderson, 2000). The failure to 
consider this aspect may explain the occasional observation that a soccer player 
turns out to be a flop after a transfer to a new team because he does not live up to 
expectations. Moreover, the specificity of certain employment relationships and 
their interdependence give rise to difficulties in evaluating investment decisions 
(Vrooman, 1996). 
For coaches, the results are less conclusive, potentially because I did not incor-
porate information about general coaching ability or information about the coach’s 
involvement in decisions regarding the engagement of new players. The latter as-
pect may have an impact on the coach’s tenure because the more influence a coach 
has to chose players according to his tactical concepts, the more team-specific his 
relationship with the club may become. With these relationship-specific (or man-
agement-specific) investments, the coach can safeguard his position because his 
layoff becomes increasingly costly for the club management (see Shleifer and 
Vishney, 1989). The introduction of adequate proxy variables that capture the de-
gree of the coach’s general human capital as well as the specificity of his em-
ployment relationship would be a sensible extension of this study. 
Whenever correlational designs are used, concerns about internal validity such 
as possible reverse causality may be raised. My finding that team-specific human 
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capital increases team performance could be spurious if continuity in the team 
composition was simply a consequence of successful team performance. In order 
to test for potential reverse causality, I regressed the team’s stock of team-specific 
human capital on team performance, lagged one time period, using the same team 
fixed effects estimation approach and the same control variables as in the main 
model. In doing so, I find a positive (b = 0.05) but insignificant (p-value = 0.51) 
influence of previous team performance on specific human capital. Thus, I find no 
evidence for reverse causality running from team performance to specific human 
capital.  
An alternative explanation for the results may be provided by Jovanovic’s 
(1979) matching theory. If I assume that, in general, unproductive employments 
will be terminated and productive employments will be prolonged, then I must 
conclude that tenure should be a good indicator of productivity. Or, as Flinn 
(1986) put it: “The longer an employment spell continues, the more precise is the 
estimate of the match.” I am unable to distinguish between the impact of the speci-
ficity of the relationships and the impact of the precision of the match estimate 
because both increase with tenure and both have a positive effect on team perfor-
mance. However, the observation that team-specific human capital is positively 
correlated with team performance in a highly transparent production process with 
minimal information asymmetries concerning the players’ performances and ca-
pabilities suggests that performance increments are more likely due to team-
specific human capital. I argue that in soccer, precise ex ante information with 
which to estimate a match is publicly available. In non-sports industries, external 
employers have only limited access to ex ante information and must therefore de-
duce less precise estimates of the real productivities (Barron and Loewenstein, 
1985; Greenwald, 1986). An employer continuously gains information regarding 
an employee’s initially unknown performance-relevant characteristics. However, it 
is unrealistic to assume that this information will be transferred to a new employer 
if it can be kept private (Wilde, 1977; Johnson, 1978). Thus, information asymme-
tries between the current employer and potential external employers may be a rea-
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sonable explanation of the tendency to prolong existing employments, but this 
argument is hardly applicable to soccer teams.  
Another peculiarity of soccer that may limit the transferability of the results to 
other industries concerns the issue of moral hazard in teams (e.g., Holmstrom, 
1982). Almost perfect monitoring in the stadium and on TV compels players to 
strive for excellence and impedes collusion between some of the team’s players. 
However, in most other professional contexts, moral hazard problems are more 
likely to emerge because the employees’ actions are less observable.  
In order to explore the transferability of the results, I advocate further investi-
gation of the relationship between the composition of team-specific human capital 
and team performance in other contexts involving teamwork. 
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2.5 Appendix A 
Teams included in the sample, their respective presence in the Bundesliga within 
the timeframe of the data set and some descriptive statistics are shown below: 
 
Table 3: Teams Included in the Sample 
Team Obs Seasons 
Borussia Dortmund 204 2001/02 to 2006/07 
Bayern München  204 2001/02 to 2006/07 
FC Schalke 04  204 2001/02 to 2006/07 
Borussia Mönchengladbach  204 2001/02 to 2006/07 
Hamburger SV  204 2001/02 to 2006/07 
Hansa Rostock  136 2001/02 to 2004/05 
1860 München  102 2001/02 to 2003/04 
Werder Bremen  204 2001/02 to 2006/07 
VfB Stuttgart  204 2001/02 to 2006/07 
SC Freiburg  102 2001/02; 2003/04 to 2004/05 
1. FC Köln  102 2001/02; 2003/04; 2005/06 
Bayer Leverkusen  204 2001/02 to 2006/07 
FC St. Pauli  34 2001/02 
1. FC Kaiserslautern  170 2001/03 to 2005/06 
Eintracht Frankfurt  102 2003/04; 2005/06 to 2006/07 
VfL Bochum  136 2002/03 to 2004/05; 2006/07 
MSV Duisburg  34 2005/06 
Arminia Bielefeld  136 2002/03; 2004/05 to 2006/07 
Hertha BSC Berlin  204 2001/02 to 2006/07 
VfL Wolfsburg  204 2001/02 to 2006/07 
1. FC Nürnberg  170 2001/02 to 2002/03; 2004/05 to 2006/07 
Energie Cottbus  102 2001/02 to 2002/03; 2006/07 
Hannover 96  170 2002/03 to 2006/07 
FSV Mainz 05  102 2004/05 to 2006/07 
Alemannia Aachen 34 2006/07 
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2.6 Appendix B 
A sample calculation of the proxy variable for a team’s stock of team-specific hu-
man capital is shown below: 
 
Mean of all fielded team members’ team- 
specific human capital on a team-match level = 
 
 
 
For illustration purposes, consider the following (real) example of Borussia 
Dortmund on the first match day of the 2001/02 season. The fielded players (start-
ing lineup as well as the substitute players) have the following histories with Bo-
russia Dortmund.  
 
Table 4: An Example for Prior Appearances  
 Player Prior appearances for Borussia Dortmund 
1. Jens Lehmann 76 
2. Christian Wörns 50 
3. Jan Derek Sörensen 10 
4. Dede 85 
5. Tomas Rosicky 16 
6. Giuseppe Reina 58 
7. Miroslav Stevic 68 
8. Jörg Heinrich 31 
9. Jan Koller 1 
10. Lars Ricken 187 
11. Marcio Amoroso 1 
12. Jürgen Kohler 170 
13. Stefan Reuter 218 
14. Evanilson 54 
! 
      (player i's number of prior appearances for team) 
All fielded players
"
Number of fielded players
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Note that “Prior appearances for Borussia Dortmund” only take into account 
the period during which the player has continuously stayed with his current team. 
In the event that a player had already played for the current team in the past, then 
changed to another team before returning to his current time, only the period fol-
lowing his most recent transfer is factored in. In my example, Jörg Heinrich 
played for Borussia Dortmund from the 1995/96 through the 1997/98 season. In 
the following two season, he played in Italy for AC Florence and returned to 
Dortmund for the 2000/01 season. According to my conceptualization, I only con-
sider his experience with Borussia Dortmund after his transfer from Florence. 
Thus, on the first match day of the 2001/02 season, it is his 31st appearance in a 
league match with Borussia Dortmund.  
These data yield the following calculations of Borussia Dortmund’s mean of 
team-specific human capital: 
 
 
 
 
I do not weight the player-team specific human capital with the playing time on 
the pitch for two reasons: first, the playing times are very similar, as the number of 
possible substitutions is restricted to three. Second, and even more important, the 
team’s stock of team-specific human capital would be affected by red cards, which 
reduces the team’s sum of playing time and would therefore distort the effect of 
team-specific human capital. 
 
 
 
 
 
! 
76 + 50 +10 + 85 +16 + 58 + 68 + 31+1+187 +1+170 + 218 + 54
14 = 73.21
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3 How Expectations Affect Managerial Change11 
3.1 Introduction 
The objective of a manager in all sorts of organizations is to develop and deploy 
selected resources and capabilities in order to generate organizational rents (Amit 
and Shoemaker, 1993). Thereby he is generally held accountable for the perfor-
mance within his area of responsibility. In case results repeatedly fall short of ex-
pectations the manager has to fear sanctions like being assigned to a less prestig-
ious position or even being fired (e.g., Groves, Hong, McMilan, and Naughton, 
1995).  
The economic relevance of a dismissal and its associated contingencies is un-
questioned. In their review of 30 years of research on managerial change, Kesner 
and Sebora (1994) even remark that “… few if any transitions at other organiza-
tional levels have as profound an effect either inside or outside the firm” (p. 357). 
Standard economic theory suggests that the subjacent motivation is either to in-
crease profits or to reduce losses. For all practical purposes a replacement decision 
is admittedly not as easily made because respective decision makers usually face a 
high degree of uncertainty in terms of the post-succession effect.  
Despite extensive empirical analyses no generally accepted model has emerged 
so far (e.g., Lieberson and O’Connor, 1972; Weiner and Mahoney, 1981; Virany, 
Tushman, and Romanelli, 1992; Denis and Denis, 1995; Shen and Cannella, 
2002). Scholars investigating the determinants of managerial change generally 
agree on the critical importance of performance expectations, but the problem of 
                                     
11  A revised version of this chapter will be published in Pieper, J., Nüesch, S., and Franck, E. (forthcoming). 
How performance expectations affect managerial replacement decisions. Schmalenbach Business Review. 
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specification has only deficiently been solved so far (DellaVigna, 2009). A related 
drawback of many existing studies is that they are incapable of estimating devia-
tions from expectations because they lack objective and reliable performance data 
that the manager can be held accountable for.  
In this chapter, I attempt to address these obstacles in order to derive more val-
id conclusions. Using a detailed panel data set of team performance from the 
German Bundesliga, I develop a full-fledged analysis of the determinants of man-
agerial change. In particular, I draw on Köszegi and Rabin (2006) and assume that 
actual performances are benchmarked relative to a rationally expected reference 
point. The innovative specification of performance expectations is based on sup-
plementary data on betting odds. These prediction market prices are continuously 
updated and aggregate all relevant information available until shortly before the 
match (e.g. relative playing strength, relative coaching quality, season aspirations, 
momentum effects, unforeseen player injuries, etc.).  
Following prospect theory, which predicts how people choose between alterna-
tives that involve risk (Kahneman and Tversky, 1979), I hypothesize that (i) the 
probability of a coach dismissal increases with expectations, even after controlling 
for the actual performance of the team and (ii) that coaches are more likely to be 
fired if they fail to meet expectations, compared to peers with equal performance 
who meet or beat expectations. Both hypotheses are confirmed by the data.  
The remainder of this chapter is structured as follows: First, I outline the basic 
limitations of prior studies on managerial change in general and of respective 
sports studies in particular. I then review the literature of relevant sports studies 
with contemplation of their methodological developments in more detail. In the 
subsequent methodological part, I describe the dependent and independent varia-
bles and derive the hypotheses, followed by the presentation of our, data, and re-
sults. I conclude with a discussion of the main findings as well as some sugges-
tions for further research. 
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3.2 Conceptual Background 
Despite extensive empirical research on the determinants of managerial change 
results remain largely contradictory. The specification of expectations constitutes a 
major obstacle in investigating managerial change. As mentioned above, decision 
makers face a high degree of uncertainty when they terminate a managerial em-
ployment. Hence, research on the determinants of managerial change is informed 
by theory on individual risk-taking behavior (Libby and Fishburn, 1977; Lopes, 
1987; Sitkin and Pablo, 1992) and by theory integrating individual risk-taking 
behavior with decision-making processes in organizations (Staw, Sandelands, and 
Dutton, 1981; Milliken and Lant, 1991; Ocasio, 1995). Most prominently, 
Kahneman and Tversky (1979) formulate the importance of expectations in their 
prospect theory and predict how people choose between alternatives that involve 
risk. Contingent on certain goals the alternatives are evaluated relative to a refer-
ence point with lower outcomes as losses and larger outcomes as gains. According 
to their proposed s-shaped value function, people generally show a significantly 
greater aversion to losses than appreciation of gains.  
In the literature there is general agreement that expectations matter and empiri-
cal studies on risk taking in business situations support the predictions of prospect 
theory. Results confirm an increase in risk taking below the reference point (Lant 
and Montgomery, 1987; Wehrung, 1989) and managers report taking fewer risks 
when performance exceeds their goals (Singh, 1986; March and Shapira, 1987). 
However, existing approaches are unable to completely resolve ambiguity. The 
determination of the reference point is still a key issue in the literature on refer-
ence point-driven behavior (see DellaVigna, 2009 for a comprehensive review).  
Köszegi and Rabin (2006) offer a solution to mutually inconsistent predictions 
of different plausible specifications of the reference point (e.g., status quo, lagged 
status quo, the mean of the chosen lottery) in order to simplify the application of 
the theory. They assume that in most situations people have some ability to predict 
their own environment and behavior. Thus, they suggest to model the reference 
point as a person’s rational expectations held in the recent past about outcomes 
and consistent with optimal behavior given expectations.  
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A second obstacle in this context is the measurement of performance. The more 
complex the structure of a firm, the more difficult it is to isolate a single person’s 
impact on performance (Wright, McMahan, and McWilliams, 1994). As manage-
rial change is typically accompanied by simultaneous changes, it is difficult to 
assess the performance impacts attributable to individual managerial quality. Also, 
the measurement of performance may be complicated because the interests of the 
firm’s decision makers are not necessarily aligned but may, on the contrary, di-
verge substantially. The intransparency of internal personnel decisions further 
restricts the investigation of managerial change. Firms usually have no particular 
interest in publicly disclosing information about their promotion and demotion 
mechanisms (Koning, 2003). The fact that most performance measures are prone 
to misinterpretation may also increase organizational inertia or resistance to 
change (Hirschman, 1970; Milliken and Lant, 1991). Similarly, decision makers 
facing decisions with a high degree of uncertainty tend to simplify evaluation by 
transforming a continuous performance measure into a discrete measure of subjec-
tive success or failure (March, 1988).   
Moreover, organizations do not necessarily change managers whenever their 
recent performance negatively deviates from rational expectations. The probability 
of managerial change is also contingent on the opportunity to change, which con-
stitutes a third difficulty for empirical testing. Frequently, predetermined or at 
least anticipatable opportunities arise to change a poorly performing management. 
In these cases dysfunctional productivity effects following the succession can be 
mitigated by adequate preparation. Typical events may be an election defeat in a 
political party, the retirement at a certain age in a business or a public organiza-
tion, or the end of a disappointing season in a sports club. However, managerial 
change can also be observed at less convenient times, not allowing for detailed 
preplanning of the transition. Assuming that managers do not voluntarily with-
draw, explanations for such short-termed dismissals may be inter alia strong un-
derperformance, personal misconduct, or external factors, such as stakeholder 
pressure or takeover attempts. The timely limited use of risk-reducing provisions 
even increases the risk involved with respective decisions to dismiss a manager. 
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These obstacles give rise to a strong tradition of research based on team sports 
data within the empirical literature (see Audas, Dobson, and Goddard, 2002 for a 
review). The position in sports analogous to a manager in a firm is a head coach.  
In order to address the research question of how expectations affect managerial 
change, the sport context offers the unique opportunity to make use of betting 
odds in order to account for continuously updated expectations about match out-
comes. These prediction market prices incorporate all relevant information availa-
ble until shortly before the match (e.g., relative playing strength, relative coaching 
quality, season aspirations, momentum effects, unforeseen player injuries). 
Moreover, accurate data on measures of individual and team performance are 
readily observable because the production process of a soccer match takes place in 
a highly transparent and controlled field environment. One might object that team 
outcomes are objectively reflected in match results but that the underlying pro-
cesses that determine team productivity are relatively opaque. Of course, the 
coach’s ability to control match outcomes is constrained by chronic unpredictabil-
ity surrounding the fitness, performance, and cooperation of the players. However, 
unlike elsewhere is the business world, all coaches are equally affected by this 
uncertainty. The club’s and the coach’s interests are almost perfectly aligned be-
cause the coach’s objective is precisely defined: He is in charge of developing, 
motivating, and selecting players from the roster in order to accumulate as many 
points as possible. Individually, each match is a zero-sum game, and the inevita-
bility of failure for some teams is inherent in any league where the only outcomes 
that eventually count are team rankings. The mechanisms of promotion and rele-
gation also create substantial incentives to be successful. 
Usually, the principal-agent-relationship is characterized by larger information 
asymmetries with the principal being the disadvantaged party because the agent 
enjoys some discretion when performing his job. Since the principal can only con-
trol the agent at some considerable costs, the agent is tempted to behave opportun-
istically (Jensen and Meckling, 1976). However, due to almost perfect monitoring 
mechanisms, the occurrence of coaches showing moral hazard behavior is unlikely 
in professional sports. Any form of misbehavior becomes immediately obvious 
and can be sanctioned accordingly.  
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Compared to other managerial employments, turnover rates of coaches are high 
in team sports, which facilitates empirical investigations.12 Changes in the soccer 
team’s coaching position are perfectly documented. Due to a large public interest 
in the clubs’ personnel decision and almost continuous media coverage there is 
hardly any other context imaginable that allows for a comparably precise distinc-
tion between voluntary and involuntary dismissals as well as a profound investiga-
tion of the underlying reasons.  
 
 
3.3 Related Literature 
There are a number of studies analyzing the determinants of managerial change in 
various team sports. Scully (1994), for example, examines the relationship be-
tween managerial efficiency and managerial survival rates using season-level data 
from basketball, (American) football and baseball. In different maximum-
likelihood Weibull regression models managerial tenure is found to be linked to 
managerial efficiency, i.e., the coach’s ability to extract the largest win percentage 
from a given pool of playing talent.  
Fitzel and D’Itri (1997) use season-level data from US college basketball teams 
from seven seasons to estimate the probability of voluntary and involuntary coach 
dismissal. A data envelopment analysis (DEA) model measures the efficiency of a 
given manager relative to the efficiency of all managers in the industry. They find 
out that managerial efficiency and the team’s pool of playing talent initially have a 
significantly negative effect on coaching tenure. However, the effect disappears 
when the team’s win ratio is entered into the regression. For coaching experience 
no effect is found in either model.  
                                     
12  Frick (1998) found out that in the German Bundesliga a head coach’s mean tenure amounts to 12.5 mon-
ths. Whereas, coaches who take their position at the beginning of a new season are in charge for 15.9 
months on average, their colleagues, who take over a team within the season, only stay for 7.4 months on 
average. 
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Audas, Dobson, and Goddard (1999) take further covariates into account and 
focus on the link between very short-term fluctuations in team performance and 
managerial hazard rates using match-level data from the English Premier League 
over a period of 25 seasons. Employing a Cox proportional hazard model, the au-
thors find out that involuntary termination is highly contingent on team perfor-
mance in the most recent matches. The nine preceding match results all exert a 
statistically significant impact on the hazard, as does the win ratio for the entire 
current spell. Whether the team’s current position is higher or lower than its posi-
tion when the coach took charge is also a crucial factor. The hazard rate is insensi-
tive to coaching experience but increases with the coach’s age. 
Salomo and Teichmann (2000) choose a logistic regression model to investi-
gate the probability of involuntary within-season coaching dismissal, using match-
level data from 20 seasons of the German Bundesliga. The central covariates of 
their analysis are concerned with the performance of the entire season and of the 
most recent matches. Both are further categorized into objective and subjective 
performance, whereas the latter is based on the objectives proclaimed in the sport 
press before the season starts. Especially the performance development within the 
short term in relation to objectives set at the beginning of the season is found to 
have a significant effect on the decision to replace the coach. The intensity of local 
media coverage and a recent turnover of the board president position are two other 
variable that significantly contribute to an increase of the probability of a coach 
dismissal. 
In a study by Hope (2003) operations research techniques are used to estimate 
the optimal time to dismiss a coach in English Premiership and Nationwide 
League football, based on season-level data of six seasons. Unfortunately, derived 
hiring and firing decisions are only based on coach’s winning percentage and thus 
unlikely to be optimal. Implicitly, the model is only calibrated against the average 
club.  
Employing a discrete-time logistic framework, Bachan, Reilly, and Witt (2005) 
make use of English football match-level data from (only) one season to investi-
gate involuntary termination of coaches’ employment status. The authors model 
the hazard based on the spell at risk, rather than the individual. In accordance with 
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Audas, Dobson, and Goddard’s (1999) findings, deviations from the league posi-
tion at the start of the spell are found to be the most important determinant of a 
coach’s exit. Individual human capital covariates (i.e., age, experience, length of 
service, ethnicity) are found to be unimportant in explaining coach dismissals. 
Managers whose teams are threatened by relegation are significantly more likely 
to be sacked than their colleagues of more successful teams. 
Audas, Goddard, and Rowe (2006) use match-level data from the National 
Hockey League (NHL) to model employment durations of coaches with a logit 
specification. A statistically significant link between individual match results and 
the coaching hazard is found for up to 15 matches prior to the current match. The 
direct impact of match results remains unaffected even if expected match out-
comes, obtained from an ordered probit match results model, are taken into ac-
count. However, expectations appear not to be irrelevant as the hazard is sensitive 
to the team’s current position in the standings relative to the position predicted by 
a panel of experts pre-season. The probability of an involuntary separation de-
creases with the age of the coach and increases if the coach was previously em-
ployed as a player by his current team. 
Tena and Forrest (2007) construct a probit model to account for within-season 
dismissal of coaches in the Spanish Premier League based on match-level data of 
three seasons. Their results indicate that dismissals typically occurred at clubs, 
which were underperforming relative to the size of their budget. Being in a relega-
tion position in the standings, rather than a run of poor results per se, turns out to 
be a key trigger of deciding to sack the coach. 
Barros, Frick, and Passos (2009) use a season-level data set from 22 seasons of 
the German Bundesliga, including information on the salaries of coaches. Employ-
ing a Cox proportional hazard model, they show that higher paid coaches have no 
longer survival time compared to more poorly paid managers. Success on the field 
is the major determinant of a coach’s job tenure. The relative wage bill, reflecting 
the available playing talent, has a positive effect on the hazard. Coaches of more 
expensive teams might be more vulnerable because an underperformance increas-
es the probability of a dismissal. 
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Frick, Barros, and Prinz (2010) rely on the same data set but use a mixed logit 
model to analyze the dismissal of coaches. In contrast to Audas et al. (1999), they 
find no clear differences in the determinants voluntary and involuntary separa-
tions. Both the probability of involuntary dismissal and voluntary resignation are 
positively related to the team’s most recent performance and the remuneration of 
the input factors, i.e., the coach’s and the players’ salaries. A coach’s career win 
percentage and the number of relative points won in the current season are to 
found to decrease the probability of a coach to loose his job.  
 
 
3.4 Hypotheses 
The empirical evidence from sport studies consistently suggests that performance 
expectations are important drivers of the decision to terminate a coach’s appoint-
ment. For one thing the relevance of expectations is explicitly addressed in prior 
studies, for another thing it is only implicitly presumed. In either way, the specifi-
cation of expectations constitutes a major obstacle for deriving universally valid 
conclusions. Different measures of reference are the relative quality of players and 
coaches of the opposing teams (Scully, 1994; Fitzel and D’Itri, 1997; Tena and 
Forrest, 2007; Frick, Barros, and Passos, 2009; Frick, Barros, and Prinz, 2010), the 
team’s recent performance (Audas, Dobson, and Goddard, 1999; Salomo and 
Teichmann, 2000; Audas, Goddard, and Rowe, 2006), the team’s league standing 
predicted by a panel of experts pre-season (Audas, Goddard, Rowe, 2006), the 
team’s league standing when the coach took charge (Audas, Dobson, and God-
dard, 1999; Bachan, Reilly, and Witt, 2005), or the self-defined target standing in 
the league as articulated in the sport press before season start (Salomo and Teich-
mann, 2000). 
However, all these approaches either ignore or do not appropriately reflect that 
the expectation of a match outcome is contingent on the relative playing strength 
of both opposing teams. In prior studies scholars simplify evaluation by using a 
discrete measure of home wins, away wins, and draws, regardless of the opposi-
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tion team in the respective match. Alternatively, proxy variables for relative play-
ing strength are only based on broad season-level data, but not on match-level 
data.  
We, in contrast, build on the approach of Köszegi and Rabin (2006), who sug-
gest to model the reference point as a person’s rational expectations held in the 
recent past about outcomes and consistent with optimal behavior given expecta-
tions. Specifically, I assume that a club’s decision makers continuously update the 
performance expectations for which they hold their coaches accountable. As the 
mere consideration of a team’s recent performances or its expected league stand-
ing cannot account for this updating process, I make use of betting odds on match 
outcomes. Bookmakers have large financial incentives to appropriately assess 
match outcome probabilities. The betting market provides predictions that aggre-
gate all relevant information on a specific match and are continuously updated 
until shortly before kickoff. Playing strength, general coaching quality, season 
aspirations, momentum effects, unforeseen player injuries, and so forth are simul-
taneously incorporated for both opposing teams in the respective match.  
Evidently, higher expectations are more difficult for the coach to meet. I there-
fore predict that, regardless of the actual performance, the dismissal likelihood 
increases with expectations.  
 
Hypothesis 1: 
 
The higher the expectations, the more likely is coaches to be fired, controlling for 
the performance of the team.  
 
 
According to Kahneman and Tversky’s (1979) prospect theory, alternatives are 
evaluated relative to a reference point with lower outcomes as losses and larger 
outcomes as gains. In case of losses, the theory predicts that decision makers are 
more likely to show risk seeking behavior. Applied to professional football, I ex-
pect the probability of a coach dismissal to increase with upset losses. Hoping for 
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a positive shock effect, the decision makers become more willing to accept the 
risk associated with the employment termination. 
 
 
Hypothesis 2: 
 
Coaches who fail to meet expectations are more likely to be fired than peers who 
meet or beat expectations, controlling for the team performance.  
 
 
3.5 Methodology 
3.5.1 Dependent Variable  
I attempt to explain managerial change in a given match-day. The dependent vari-
able is the binary variable Yit, where Yit = 1
 
if the coach of team i is dismissed in 
match-day t (Yit = 0 otherwise).  
 
 
3.5.2 Independent Variables 
The bookmaker’s (fixed) odds provide a good predictor of the likelihood of a cer-
tain match outcome (Wolfers and Zitzewitz, 2006). Forrest, Goddard, and Sim-
mons (2005) show that bookmaker odds are more effective in predicting match 
outcomes than a benchmark statistical model that incorporates a large number of 
quantifiable variables.  
For each possible match outcome k ! {HomeWin, Draw, AwayWin} the book-
maker posts decimal odds oitk (e.g., 2.0) that represent the payout ratios for a win-
ning bet of the match outcome k of team i in match t. To get the bookmaker mar-
ket’s forecast of an outcome, I transform the odds oitk into implicit probabilities 
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pitk. The implicit probability is simply the inverse of the odds adjusted for the mar-
gin included in the odds. Formally: 
 
! 
pitk =
1
oitk
1
oitk
i
" .
 
 
I use the pitk as a predictor of the probability of the underlying match outcome 
occurring. In order to derive the expected points I calculate:  
 
Expected Pointsit = pit, win * 3 + pit, draw * 1 
 
The variable Expected Points is aggregated over a varying number of previous 
matches, namely three, six, and nine matches, and constitutes an adequate proxy 
variable of the expectations a coach faces.  
In order to test hypothesis 2, I need a measure of underperformance (i.e., the 
actual team performance falls short of expectations). To do so, I compare the actu-
al team performance with the expected performance according to the bookmaker 
odds. If the actual performance is higher than the expected performance, the coach 
is able to beat expectations. If the realized number of points of the previous three, 
six, and nine matches is lower than the expected number of points, the coach fails 
to meet expectations. Thus, the variable Underperformanceit equals 1 if the differ-
ence between actual minus expected number of points is negative (0 if positive). 
Here again, the variable may include the previous three, six, and nine matches.  
As already mentioned in the hypotheses, I control for the performance of the 
team as covariate. To do so, I include for the team’s current rank in the league. 
The league standing variable  varies between 1 (best team) to 18 (worst 
team). Following Audas, Dobson, and Goddard (2002), Bachan, Reilly, and Witt 
(2005), and Tena and Forrest (2007), I also consider the critical importance of 
avoiding relegation. A club might be more willing to dismiss a coach if it is in the 
relegation ranks because it becomes more risk loving and hopes to use an initial 
boost in performance of a new coach to draw clear of danger. I therefore include a 
! 
Rankit
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control variable Relegation equaling 1 if the team’s league position is in the rele-
gation ranks 16 to 18 (0 if otherwise).  
Moreover, I control for unobservable, but time-constant team heterogeneity. 
Time-constant team heterogeneity may be correlated with both performance ex-
pectations and managerial change. Finally, I account for common time trends by 
seasonal dummies.  
 
 
3.5.3 Data 
In order to test the hypotheses, I use a large panel of match-level data of teams 
appearing in the highest German soccer league, the Bundesliga, from the 2001/02 
season to the 2005/06 season. In each season each of the league’s 18 teams plays 
each other team in one home and one away match, resulting in 34 matches per 
team and season and a total of 612 team-match observations per season. Since the 
data set covers five seasons, I dispose of 3060 team-match observations. I supple-
ment the performance data by corresponding betting odds from the bookmaking 
company Oddset. Due to the relegation of the three lowest-ranked teams and the 
promotion of the three highest-ranked teams of the second Bundesliga at the end 
of the season, the study sample comprises 24 teams. Within the sample period I 
observed 46 involuntary and 19 voluntary coaching dismissals. The distinction 
between voluntary and involuntary employment terminations was made based on 
extensive content analysis of press articles using the LexisNexis database and 
webpages using Google searches. Table 5 illustrates the descriptive statistics of 
the dependent as well as the explanatory variables.  
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Table 5: Variables, Descriptive Statistics, and Pearson Correlation Coefficients 
 
Note: N = 3060 
 
 
Due to obvious reasons, there is substantial multicollinearity between the ex-
pected number of points in the previous three, six, and nine matches as well as 
between the variables Underperformanceit in the previous three, six, and nine 
matches. I therefore include only one variable at a time and estimate three differ-
ent specifications to test the hypotheses.  
 
 
3.5.4 Analysis and Results 
We estimate the influence of expectations on the probability of a coaching dismis-
sal with a linear probability model (LPM). I prefer LPM over probit or logit mod-
els for two reasons. First, unlike logit and probit estimates, the consistency of 
LPM estimates do not crucially rely on the normality and homoskedasticity of the 
error term. Second, estimated effects in the LPM model can be interpreted directly 
as marginal effects, whereas the marginal effects in logit and probit models de-
 Variable Mean SD 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 
1 Involuntary Dismissal 0.02 0.12 1.00         
2 Expected points previous three matches 3.88 1.14 0.01 1.00        
3 Expected points previous six matches 7.47 2.46 0.01 0.90 1.00       
4 Expected points previous nine matches 10.80 3.98 0.02 0.83 0.96 1.00      
5 Underperformance previous three matches 0.48 0.50 0.07 -0.02 -0.01 0.00 1.00     
6 Underperformance previous six matches 0.46 0.50 0.07 -0.07 -0.05 -0.04 0.55 1.00    
7 Underperformance previous nine matches 0.44 0.50 0.08 -0.13 -0.11 -0.09 0.47 0.69 1.00   
8 Rank 9.48 5.19 0.09 -0.54 -0.52 -0.50 0.26 0.36 0.42 1.00  
9 Relegation status 0.17 0.37 0.10 -0.31 -0.30 -0.28 0.18 0.25 0.29 0.65 1.00 
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pend on all other covariates including the fixed effects. Table 6 presents the mar-
ginal effects and the standard errors. The standard errors are White heteroskedas-
ticity robust and clustered at the team level to take potential serial correlation of 
the error terms of team observations into account. 
 
Table 6: The Effect of Expectations on Involuntary Coaching Dismissals 
Explanatory variables 1 2 3 
Expected points previous three games 0.008 ***     
 (0.001)      
Expected points previous six games   0.004 ***   
   (0.001)    
Expected points previous nine games     0.003 *** 
     (0.001)  
Rank 0.002 *** 0.002 *** 0.003 *** 
 (0.001)  (0.001)  (0.001)  
Relegation status 0.025 ** 0.024 ** 0.024 ** 
 (0.011)  (0.011)  (0.011)  
Team fixed effects yes  yes  yes  
Season fixed effects yes   yes   yes   
R2 (within) 0.02  0.02  0.02  
Observations 3060  3060  3060  
       
Note: Table 6 shows the estimates of Linear Probability Model (LPM) of being fired. White heteroskedastici-
ty robust standard errors clustered at the team level in parantheses. Significance levels (two-tailed): * 10%, ** 
5%, *** 1%. 
  
 
Table 6 shows that high expectations generally increase the probability of being 
fired. The number of expected points in the last three, six, and nine matches all 
significantly impact involuntary coaching dismissals. The point estimates may 
appear small. However, in comparison to a base line probability of 1.5% of being 
fired after any random game, the point estimates are quite substantial.  
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The effects of the control variables are consistent with the predictions. Coaches 
are more likely to be fired if their team is low in the current league table (high 
rank). If the team is in the relegation zone, the probability of being fired addition-
ally increases in a statistically significant way. Thus, I find hypothesis 1 confirmed 
in the data. The higher the expectations, the more likely the coach will be fired, 
controlling for the current league standing and the relegation status of the team.  
 
Table 7: The Effect of Underperformance on Involuntary Coaching Dismissals 
Explanatory variables 1 2 3 
Underperformance previous three games 0.011 ***     
 (0.003)      
Underperformance previous six games   0.011 ***   
   (0.004)    
Underperformance previous nine games     0.012 *** 
     (0.005)  
Rank 0.0015 ** 0.0014 ** 0.0013 ** 
 (0.0007)  (0.0006)  (0.0006)  
Relegation status 0.025 ** 0.025 ** 0.0249 ** 
 (0.011)  (0.011)  (0.011)  
Team fixed effects yes  yes  yes  
Seasonal fixed effects yes   yes   yes   
R2 (within) 0.01  0.01  0.01  
Observations 3060   3060   3060   
       
Note: Table 7 shows the estimates of Linear Probability Model (LPM) of being fired. White heteroskedastici-
ty robust standard errors clustered at the team level in parantheses. Significance levels (two-tailed): * 10%, ** 
5%, *** 1%. 
 
 
Table 7 shows the results of a model that directly tests the influence of under-
performance in the previous three, six, and nine matches on the probability of an 
employment termination in the coaching position. I find that coaches who fall 
short of expectations are more likely to be fired than peers with similar perfor-
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mance records facing lower expectations. This finding is consistent for the last 
three, six, and nine matches as selected periods of reference. Thus, hypothesis 2 
can be confirmed. Beyond negative deviations from performance expectations, the 
league rank and the relegation status have a significantly positive effect on the 
probability of involuntary dismissals.  
 
 
3.6 Discussion and Conclusion 
Scholars investigating the determinants of managerial change generally agree on 
the critical importance of performance expectations, but the problem of specifica-
tion has only deficiently been solved so far (DellaVigna, 2009). A related draw-
back of many existing studies is that they are incapable of estimating deviations 
from expectations because they lack objective and reliable performance data that 
the manager can be held accountable for.  
In this chapter, I have made an attempt address these obstacles in order to de-
rive more valid conclusions on the antecedents of managerial change. Using a de-
tailed panel data set of team performance from the German Bundesliga and sup-
plementary data on betting odds I find that (i) the probability of a coach dismissal 
increases with expectations, even after controlling for the performance of the team 
and that (ii) coaches are more likely to be fired if they fail to meet expectations, 
compared to peers with equal performance who meet expectations. Thus, expecta-
tions affect managerial change even beyond the actual performance.  
The results are largely consistent with Salomo and Teichmann’s (2000) finding, 
that the performance development within the short term in relation to objectives 
set at the beginning of the season has a significant effect on the decision to replace 
the coach. Equally, the results are in line with Audas, Goddards, and Rowe (2006), 
who also confirm the impact of expectations on managerial change. Investigating 
NHL hockey teams, they find that probability of a coach dismissal is sensitive to 
the team’s current league standing relative to the position predicted by a panel of 
experts pre-season. However, the results are more conclusive for two reasons. 
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First, I employ match-level data instead of seasonal data. Second, the innovative 
specification of performance expectations is based on prediction market prices, 
which are continuously updated and aggregate all relevant information available 
until shortly before the match for both opposing teams. We, thus, believe to make 
a unique contribution to the empirical literature on managerial change.  
What are the practical recommendations that can be derived from my research? 
Contrary to non-sport businesses the typical consequences of a soccer team’s on-
going inadequate performance are not the loss of customers and a subsequent stra-
tegic reorientation. Soccer clubs usually retain a highly loyal fan base who do not 
consider to abandon their support or transfer their allegiances elsewhere even in 
case of relegation. Due to this substantial goodwill clubs usually remain viable and 
manage to overcome acute financial duress. The flipside of this loyalty is that the 
hope for a positive shock effect of a change in the coaching position tends to gen-
erate pressures for a coach dismissal decision. In a highly competitive labor mar-
ket with only 18 coaching positions in the German Bundesliga available at a time, 
every coach in charge is perfectly aware of this threat as well as its associated 
negative signal for future engagements. For coaches in the Bundesliga it may, 
thus, pay to sign with a less ambitious team as the expectations of fans and club 
management are likely to be lower which, in turn, increases the stakeholders’ 
readiness to accept a poor performance over a couple of weeks.  
Simultaneously, however, coaches can easily work for different clubs because 
the required human capital is largely general, i.e., transferable and productively 
employable in multiple contexts. This is mainly due to the rigid technology asso-
ciated with the “production process” of a soccer match and the similar organiza-
tional structure of the clubs (Audas, Dobson, and Goddard, 1999). As a conse-
quence, a coach will be more likely to accept the higher probability of being dis-
missed in more ambitious club the more he trusts in finding an adequate future 
engagement after his dismissal. Elsewhere in the business world organizational 
structures of competitive firms are more heterogeneous. This creates more internal 
opportunities for upward, downward, and lateral mobility contingent on the man-
ager’s performance. It is more likely that the same individual can be assigned to 
another function within the same organization. 
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Future research should expand my approach by including matches other than 
Bundesliga ones, i.e., national and international cup matches. I argue that the 
coach’s job tenure should depend on all his team’s performances throughout his 
spell, except for friendly matches. In order to validate the generalizability of the 
findings, my approach should be applied to other leagues and other teams sports.  
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4 Motives for Social Identity Processes in Organizations 
4.1 Introduction 
“What do you do for a living?” This question is very common in Western societies 
to start a conversation with new acquaintances because the choice of work seems 
to effectively reveal characteristic information about a person. The contemporary 
workplace is now to figure integrally in the evaluation of self and others. Success 
and failure at work play an increasingly constitutive role in the formation of iden-
tity, whether blue or white collar worker, negative outlier or high flyer (Thatcher 
and Zhu, 2006).  
Simultaneously, organizations reduce hierarchical structures and increasingly 
rely on (self-managed) teams to sustain business success (Parker, 1993; Smith, 
1997; Rock and Pratt, 2002). In consequence of the competitive requirement to 
concert individual activities, employees are not necessarily driven by personal 
considerations only. Employees can hardly be seen as independent entities because 
their individual motivation is largely derived from and adapted to the needs, goals, 
expectations, and rewards of the respective team or organization (Ellemers, De 
Gilder, and Haslam, 2004). In traditional psychological research on work motiva-
tion, however, individuals are implicitly assumed to be separate, independent enti-
ties (e.g., Maslow, 1943; Vroom, 1964; Locke and Latham, 1990). Economists 
similarly neglect to systematically take collective goals or joint concerns into ac-
count. They are eager to construct monetary incentive schemes, which as a sole 
motivator to align interests, are evidently subject to inefficiencies (see Gibbons, 
1998; Prendergast, 1999 for reviews). 
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Therefore, I strongly agree with other scholars, who argue that scientific atten-
tion on the underlying motivations for work-related behavior in teams does not 
reflect the transformation of contemporary work situations appropriately (Am-
brose and Kulik, 1999; Erez, Kleinbeck, and Thierry, 2001, Ellemers et al., 2004).  
Social identity theory, originally introduced by Tajfel and Turner (1979), fo-
cuses on intra- and inter-group relations and is well suited for the investigation of 
social group behavior in organizational settings because organizations are internal-
ly structured groups, which are located in complex networks of inter-group rela-
tions that are characterized by power, status, and prestige differentials. The theory 
has been employed to address questions organizations are increasingly confronted 
with, such as how employees align individual and group interests so that they col-
lectively engage in activities that benefit their group or how different organiza-
tional subunits interact in a collaborative way. The answers proposed by prior 
studies are only of limited explanatory power because of their too narrow focus of 
on the human motive to affiliate with groups that are distinctive and positively 
valued in order to enhance self-esteem (Tajfel, 1978).  
The largely inconsistent and unreliable empirical evidence on this so-called 
self-esteem hypothesis (e.g., Abrams and Hogg, 1988; Hogg and Abrams, 1990, 
1993; Rubin and Hewstone, 1998) lead Hogg and colleagues (Hogg and Abrams, 
1993; Hogg and Mullin, 1999; Hogg and Terry, 2000) to propose an extended 
framework for social identity processes that incorporates the need for uncertainty 
reduction as a second fundamental motive for social identification. In their words, 
“in addition to being motivated by self-enhancement, social identity processes are 
also motivated by a need to reduce subjective uncertainty about one's perceptions, 
attitudes, feelings, and behaviors and, ultimately, one's self-concept and place 
within the social world” (Hogg and Terry, 2000, p. 124). While Hogg and Terry’s 
approach is fruitful in extending the knowledge about social identity processes, it 
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has not yet received its due attention by most organizational researchers.13  
In this chapter I attempt to extend the framework by Hogg and Terry (2000) 
who remain rather vague about the relationship between the need for self-esteem 
and the need for uncertainty reduction and consider both to be “probably inde-
pendent motivations for social identity processes”, while they also acknowledge 
that “uncertainty reduction may be more fundamentally adaptive because it con-
structs a self-concept that defines who we are and prescribes what we should per-
ceive, think, feel, and do” (p. 124). Building on this view, I argue that individuals 
more fundamentally strive to reduce uncertainty and that the pursuit of self-esteem 
is related to, or even contingent on, self-certainty. Contrary to scholars with a 
compliant notion, I am the first to provide a substantiated and comprehensive dis-
cussion on the relationship between both motives. In particular, I incorporate sig-
nificant theoretical developments from more recent, predominately psychological 
research on the need to reduce uncertainty about one’s social identity. I show that 
both motives differ substantially in terms of their conditions for activation and 
their motivational consequences.  
The second contribution resides in applying the extended theoretical framework 
to specific contextual factors in organization design that are most promising to 
benefit from a deeper understanding of the relationship between the underlying 
motives of social identity processes. For instance, recent empirical findings in the 
area of team diversity by Joshi and Roh (2009) strengthen the need to rethink so-
cial identity processes. In their meta-analysis of team diversity related studies, the 
authors point out that “current applications of social identity theory […] in diversi-
ty research are insufficient for explaining these findings” (p. 620). Specifically, I 
illustrate the relevance of my approach to reconcile opposing findings on the per-
formance effect of team-level diversity. In addition, I (i) explain when relative-pay 
schemes tend to improve or decrease team productivity, (ii) make predictions 
                                     
13  A keyword search on “self categorization” in EBSCOhost on July 30, 2010 produced four (two) hits in 
AMR (AMJ) since the appearance of Hogg and Terry’s work in 2000. Out of these, only two mention (one 
merely in a footnote) the motive of uncertainty reduction for self-categorization processes, without pur-
suing it further. 
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about the differing social identity processes in open and closed internal labor mar-
kets, and (iii) make predictions about the ease of tacit knowledge integration in 
firms. 
In order to help frame future research directions in the study of social identity 
processes and social behavior in organizational settings, I derive a range of testa-
ble propositions. Also, I point out concrete research areas that are most promising 
to benefit from an application of my approach. 
In the following section, I aim to familiarize the reader with the basic concepts 
of social identity theory and their development. 
 
 
 
4.2 Social Identity Theory 
Social identity theory, introduced by Tajfel and Turner (1979), is a diffuse but 
interrelated collection of social psychological theories concerned with when and 
why individuals identify with, and behave as part of, social groups, adopting 
shared attitudes. It is extensively employed as an explanatory tool in social scienc-
es.  
Social identity theory presumes that individuals rely on belief systems about 
the nature and the structure of the relations between groups in their social envi-
ronment. Identity is understood as a multifaceted construct: individuals typically 
develop a repertoire of personal and social identities. In social contexts in which a 
personal identity is salient, individuals will relate to others as independent entities 
in an interpersonal manner, contingent on their idiosyncratic characteristics and 
preferences. The interaction is shaped by the underlying interpersonal relationship 
(e.g., a friendship or a contract between two economic actors). In contexts in 
which social identities are salient, individuals primarily conceive themselves and 
others in terms of particular group memberships. Social identities represent the 
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subjective perception of specific groups, associated with normative rights, obliga-
tions and sanctions as well as the emotional value attached to the group member-
ship. Interactions between groups of individuals are then not affected by the per-
sonal relationships between the individuals involved (e.g., a soldier in a battlefield 
or a soccer fan in the stadium).  
Social identity theory further attempts to predict whether people are likely to 
define themselves and others as individuals or as members of a group and how 
these perceptions interpret and organize interpersonal and inter-group behavior by 
providing adaptive guidance in the social environment (Markus and Wurf, 1987; 
Shamir, 1992; Haslam, Postmes, and Ellemers, 2003). Generally, the application 
of a social category is more likely when the longevity of group memberships is 
high and the group boundary permeability is low, respectively (Ellemers, 1993). In 
social contexts in which group memberships are highly variable over time person-
al identities tend to be more salient than social identities (e.g., through a system of 
job rotation). Similarly, social identities are less cognitively accessible when indi-
vidual characteristics are more significant to the conception of the situation (e.g. a 
firm’s promotion system, which is merely based on individual merit). 
According to social identity theory, the core human need for self-esteem moti-
vates individuals to affiliate with groups that are distinctive and positively valued 
(Tajfel, 1978). Tajfel assumed that it is through social comparison between the in-
group and contextually salient out-groups that individuals achieve an understand-
ing of the relative status and value of their in-group. The characteristics of a group 
achieve most of their significance in relation to perceived differences from the 
out-group and the corresponding value connotations (Tajfel, 1978). Thus, social 
comparison depicts the means, which allows for an assessment of the in-group’s 
social status. Given the notion that identities are relational and comparative, per-
ceived group distinctiveness can change with the comparison situation. For exam-
ple, when psychology students were asked to compare themselves to art students, 
they viewed intelligence-related attributes as characteristic of their group, but in 
comparison to physics students, they considered creativity-related attributes as 
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more characteristic of their group (Spears, Doosje, and Ellemers, 1997; Haslam 
and Ellemers, 2005). 
Self-categorization theory, which constitutes a powerful elaboration of social 
identity theory, specifies more thoroughly how social categorization depersonaliz-
es the perception of self and others (Turner, 1985; Turner, Hogg, Oakes, Reicher, 
and Wetherell, 1987). It is important to note that social identity and self-
categorization theory are, in fact, different (Turner, 1999).  
Social identity theory was developed to explain a range of problems in inter-
group relations whereas self-categorization theory shows how uniform behavior 
can result from the internalization of consensual categorical attributes by in-group 
members (Turner et al., 1987). Self-categorization theory clearly complements the 
early ideas of social identity theory because it details the cognitive processes that 
generate social identity phenomena. Social categorization of self refers to a trans-
formation in self-concept and the basis of perception of others. In the process of 
depersonalization individuals cognitively abstract from their own idiosyncrasies 
and assimilate self to the contextually relevant in-group prototype. They perceive 
representative group characteristics are increasingly perceived as self-descriptive 
and vicariously partake in the success and status of the group. The degree of de-
personalization may vary across different social groups and situations.  
 Depersonalization, as the basic process underlying group phenomena, does not 
have the negative connotations of “deindividuation” or “dehumanization”. The 
adaption to prototypical beliefs, attitudes, feelings, and behavior aligns the in-
group members’ self-concepts, eventually producing, for instance, shared norms, 
cohesion, cooperation, and stereotyping. 
Generally, the process of social categorization can be explained by two intui-
tive mechanisms. The first refers to the limited information processing capability 
of the human cognitive system. Social categories reduce the informational com-
plexity of the social environment and provide a systematic means for defining and 
classifying individuals based on a polar distinction between in-group and out-
group. In a cognitive segmentation and ordering process perceived similarities of 
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the target group members are accentuated and abstracted from the members’ noisy 
individual characteristics (Turner, 1985). According to the principle of metacon-
trast, individuals tend to maximize the ratio of inter-group differences to intra-
group differences, even at the expense of absolute in-group gain (Tajfel, Billig, 
Bundy, and Flament, 1971). The cognitive representations of social groups are 
often based on exemplary members who best embody the group or on abstract 
ideal types (Hogg and Terry, 2000). The benefits of social categorization, such as 
saved cognitive resources and an increased information processing speed, typical-
ly overcompensate the costs of such assignments’ reduced reliability (Hamilton, 
1981).  
The second, related mechanism refers to selective loyalties. Each group re-
quires its members’ attention and support but individual capacities to affiliate with 
different social groups are limited. Thus, the claims associated with selected group 
memberships must be prioritized according to their meaning to the individual. 
This hierarchical differentiation of social categories provides structure for an indi-
vidual’s life. The basis for prioritizing both current and potential, future-oriented 
memberships are the individual’s opportunity costs of alternative memberships 
and/or reduced individuality due to the associated process of depersonalization. 
Empirical evidence has shown that social categorization can lead to strong in-
group favoritism (Brewer, 2000; Hewstone, Rubin, and Willis, 2002). Group 
members are prone to consider their own group as superior to other groups, even 
when there are few or no obvious extrinsic causes for this bias. Some studies show 
that the mere perception of belonging to two distinct groups is sufficient to elicit 
discriminatory responses against the out-group. Such biased inter-group evalua-
tions can be understood as a result of the theory’s hypothesized need for self-
esteem via positive distinctiveness (Brown, 2000). 
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4.3 The Uncertainty Reduction Hypothesis 
The assumed core motivation for self-esteem implies that low self-esteem moti-
vates social identity processes like social identification and inter-group behavior, 
which are most promising to be self-esteem enhancing (Abrams and Hogg, 1988). 
However, research on the self-esteem hypothesis reveals inconsistent and unrelia-
ble findings, indicating some need for conceptual improvements (e.g., Abrams and 
Hogg, 1988; Hogg and Abrams, 1990, 1993; Rubin and Hewstone, 1998). The 
more recent focus on social categorization processes, in particular, has initiated a 
discussion on another core human motivation for social identity beside the need 
for self-esteem. This elaboration can be subsumed under the term uncertainty re-
duction hypothesis. Its basic assumption is that individuals attempt to gain certain-
ty about their place within the social world (Hogg and Abrams, 1993; Hogg and 
Mullin, 1999; Hogg and Terry, 2000). The hypothesis implicitly revisits Festing-
er’s (1954) original belief that there is a “motivation to know that one’s opinions 
are correct and to know precisely what one is and is not capable of doing” (p. 
217).  
Obviously, the distinction between certainty and uncertainty is not categorical. 
Additionally, uncertainty may vary in terms of its impact, ranging from largely 
inconsequential questions, such as “Will it rain tonight?” to deeply troubling ques-
tions, such as “Will I lose my job?” In the psychological literature, there seems to 
be a consensus that individual tolerance for uncertainty is no stable personality 
trait but more of a cognitive and/or emotional orientation, which is responsive to 
and shaped by past experiences and social contexts (Furnham, 1995).14 Thus, tol-
erance for uncertainty does not only vary across individuals. Also intra-
individually, the reaction to uncertainty is not necessarily continuous and stable. 
De facto, many employees actively avoid uncertainty, others simply tolerate it, 
                                     
14  Uncertainty should be distinguished from the related but distinct concept of ambiguity. Whereas ambigui-
ty implies that the alternatives are known, uncertainty is somewhat more encompassing and implies that 
the alternatives are potentially unknown or even unknowable (Clampitt and Williams, 2005).  
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while few actively embrace it. However, this does not affect my reasoning as I 
focus on intra- and inter-group processes. Regardless of individual exceptions, 
uncertainty is generally perceived as cognitively and emotionally challenging be-
cause it creates a feeling of discomfort and weakness. Besides, researchers typical-
ly have not reported that tolerance for uncertainty systematically varies on the 
basis of gender, age, or education level (Furnham, 1995).  
It is likely that contextually important uncertainties are particularly those that 
are self-conceptually important. Uncertainties that affect the self-concept can 
hardly be reduced by the acquisition of knowledge but rather by self-conceptual 
reorientation. The self-categorization process is ideally suited to this as it provides 
consensual alignment and mutual confirmation of in-group members’ self-
conceptually relevant beliefs, attitudes, and behavior. Simultaneously, the pur-
posed differentiation from salient out-groups helps to define a prototype, which 
describes and prescribes how to behave and what to expect from the social envi-
ronment (Hogg, 2000). Thus, the uncertainty reduction hypothesis generally pre-
dicts that uncertainty motivates self-categorization and psychological group for-
mation (Hogg and Abrams, 1993; Hogg and Mullin, 1999). Specifically, individu-
als will be more likely to identify with an available self-inclusive social category 
as their subjectively perceived uncertainty increases.15 
In the following section, I briefly outline previous work on uncertainty in or-
ganization theory in order to illustrate the nexus with the preceding discussion on 
the uncertainty reduction hypothesis. 
 
 
                                     
15  Additional support for this view comes from Hofstede’s work on cultural differences (1980, 1983, 1984). 
He argued that cultures differ in terms of their influence on uncertainty avoidance in people. For instance, 
socio-cultural rules, rituals, customs, educational standards, religious orientations, and technologies are 
cultural forces, which shape individual's responses to uncertainty. He found that individuals’ tendency to 
reduce uncertainty by focusing on planning and the creation of stability was significantly correlated with 
the tendency to self-define by the depersonalized characteristics of their in-group rather than in terms of 
personal attributes and achievements. Speculating on the causality, he also reasoned that uncertainty pro-
motes collectivism as it "drives" people to join groups. 
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4.4 Uncertainty in Organization Theory 
Due to functional and economic factors, the concept of uncertainty is of critical 
importance in almost all formulations of organizations and management theories 
(e.g. Thompson, 1967; Lawrence and Lorsch, 1967; Galbraith, 1973; Williamson, 
1975; Scott, 1987). Thompson (1967) noted on the centrality of uncertainty in 
organization theory: “Uncertainty appears as the fundamental problem for com-
plex organizations, and coping with uncertainty, as the essence of the administra-
tive process” (p. 159). Researchers studying uncertainty in organizational contexts 
usually choose either an external or internal perspective. The external, more mac-
ro-level approach focuses on sources of uncertainty, which come from the external 
organizational environment (e.g., competitive pressures or government regula-
tions). Those who take the internal tact are concerned with the impact of internal 
dynamics (e.g., restructuring measures or promotion systems). Managerial think-
ing generally suggests that organizations can sustain their competitive success 
largely because its administrative efficiency regulates and controls future contin-
gencies (Williamson, 1975, 1985). Thus, all managerial tools, like strategic plan-
ning schemes, clearly defined job responsibilities, or the formulation of objectives 
are eventually designed to reduce uncertainty or to mitigate its detrimental out-
comes (Clampitt, DeKoch, and Cashman, 2000).16  
In departing from the classical, rational conceptualizations of organizations, 
contemporary institutional theorists consider the behavior of organizations as nei-
ther the result of an internally directed, nor of an externally determined rationality. 
Their explanatory concept is largely perceptual and refers to the socially con-
structed nature of organizational realities, the creation of shared knowledge and 
belief systems (Meyer and Rowan, 1977; DiMaggio and Powell, 1983). Organiza-
tional rules and structures accrue from the requirement to provide behavioral guid-
ance and to render the perception of individual contributions meaningful. More 
                                     
16  For reviews on uncertainty management, see Hogg and Mullin, 1999; Lind and Van den Bos, 2002; Van 
den Bos and Lind, 2002; Weary, Jacobson, Edwards, and Tobin, 2001. 
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specifically, defined means-to-end relations and standardized distribution of re-
sources and activities constitute the essence of organizing (Scott and Meyer, 
1994). Whereas the constructed reality is not claimed to be objective, the underly-
ing view of uncertainty as an objective environmental phenomenon remains un-
changed. In this context, uncertainty is considered a core motivation that drives 
mimetic isomorphism, i.e., it encourages cognitive and behavioral alignment of 
the organization members in order to accord the organization’s legitimacy (Weitz 
and Shenhav, 2000). A considerable advantage of this approach lies in its inde-
pendence of macro- and micro-perspectives on the organization insofar, as the 
need for consensual orientation in the social environment increases, regardless of 
whether the source of uncertainty is internal or external of the organization. This is 
largely consistent with the preceding discussion on the uncertainty reduction hy-
pothesis, and supports its applicability in organizational contexts.  
 
 
 
4.5 The Relationship Between the Need for Self-Esteem and the 
Need for Uncertainty Reduction 
If it is safe to say that people do not only like to be certain about their place in the 
social environment but also to feel good about themselves, the question emerges 
how both motivations are related in social identity contexts. So far, there is no 
scientific consensus on the relation between both motives. While a number of 
commentaries imply that uncertainty reduction and the maintenance of stability 
may be a stronger group motive than self-enhancement (e.g., Brown, Collins, and 
Schmidt, 1988; Baumgardner, 1990; Campbell, 1990; Banaji and Prentice, 1994; 
Jost and Banaji, 1994; Jost, 1995), others contend that self-esteem is pursued only 
when a certain self-concept is secured (e.g., Sedikides and Strube, 1995; Taylor, 
Neter, and Wayment, 1995). Yet, a third group of researchers argues that the need 
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for uncertainty reduction and the need for self-esteem are unrelated and that it de-
pends on the social context which motivation determines social identity processes 
(e.g., Hogg and Terry, 2000). In contrast to these scholars, empirical researchers in 
organizational contexts largely content themselves with an exclusive focus on the 
self-esteem hypothesis (e.g., Chattopadhyay, Tluchowska, and George, 2004). 
This is particularly surprising, as Marris (1996) already places uncertainty reduc-
tion at the motivational core of inter-group relations in organizational contexts. He 
argues that inter-group relations are a struggle to offload uncertainty onto other 
groups and thus construct a hierarchy of uncertainty with desirable high status 
groups characterized by low uncertainty.  
In the following, I illustrate in unprecedented depth why individuals more fun-
damentally strive to reduce uncertainty and why the pursuit of self-esteem is relat-
ed to, or even contingent on, self-certainty.  
Inter-group comparison, reflecting a group’s relative position on some evalua-
tive dimension of comparison, can reduce uncertainty but not necessarily in a posi-
tive way. Only if a group’s subjective position in relation to relevant comparison 
groups is high, it positively contributes to the self-esteem. In this case both core 
needs are satisfied simultaneously. Not less often, however, the evaluative out-
come is negative.  
Tajfel and Turner (1979) describe different coping strategies, which might be 
applied by members of socially devalued groups to sustain self-esteem. These in-
clude the individual’s disidentification and subsequent attempt to affiliate with 
groups that are associated with more favorable expectations, various “socially cre-
ative” ways of modifying comparative dimensions or referential out-groups, and 
the more collective approach of challenging the out-group’s legitimization to its 
superior position. Doosje, Ellemers, and Spears (1995) add that individuals may 
mitigate the effects of perceived inferiority by intra-group comparisons with in-
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group members, who are less well off.17 Blanz (1999) suggests that group mem-
bers may resort to absolute standards or comparisons over time if these options 
provide more positivity. He also proposes re-categorization as a means to restore 
the positivity of a social identity: in-group members can either give up their social 
identity and self-categorize as belonging to a superior out-group or they split their 
group into smaller, hierarchically differentiated subgroups in order to self-
categorize into one, which is comparatively superior. Noteworthy, there is empiri-
cal evidence for the psychological reality of all these self-esteem maintenance 
strategies (e.g., Blanz, 1999; Brown and Haeger, 1999, Brown and Middendorf, 
1996; Doosje, Ellemers, and Spears, 1999; Ellemers, 1993; Mummendey, Kessler, 
Klink, and Mielke, 1999).  
While these findings certainly have their merits, they neglect the external struc-
ture of the social environment as an integral feature of many social phenomena 
social realities. I take up the position that the external structure of social environ-
ments constrains the opportunities for socially creative re-evaluation processes 
and/or the increase in perceived positivity, which is likely to be of a rather tempo-
rary nature. Equally, the opportunities for an individual to dissociate from the pre-
sent group and to associate with a more attractive group, respectively, are often 
subject to limitations. There are certain mechanisms, which I dwell on in the fol-
lowing that constrain the pursuit of self-esteem to a substantially larger extent than 
the need for uncertainty reduction.  
First, the extent to which a group membership can help reduce subjective un-
certainty about one’s place in the social environment depends on the perception of 
the group as a coherent entity - a property that social psychologists refer to as enti-
tativity (Campbell, 1958). Entitativity increases the predictability of self-
conceptually relevant interaction processes, both within the in-group and with the 
out-group. However, when in-group entitativity is high, it is ceteris paribus more 
                                     
17  This strategy to reduce perceived inferiority may reasonably explain the phenomenon of mobbing at the 
workplace, which involves conscious psychological harassment and discrimination of an ostensibly wea-
ker employee. Mobbing behavior can result in severe psychological and occupational consequences for 
the victim (Leymann, 1990). 
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difficult for individuals to move from one social group into a more favorable one. 
 
Proposition 1:  
 
The opportunity to affiliate with an individually more favorable social group is 
contingent on the target group’s degree of entitativity. 
 
 
Second, the process of self-categorization is based on perceived similarities and 
that individuals cannot arbitrarily feign these signals in order to gain entry into a 
more attractive group. Stable and clearly delineated inter-group relations in organ-
izations typically further reduce the opportunities for upward social mobility. Even 
if similarities could be feigned, they would be self-deceptive and eventually point-
less to enhance self-esteem.18 
 
 
Proposition 2:  
 
The opportunity to affiliate with an individually more favorable social group is 
contingent on the degree to which the individual’s and target group members’ 
consistently perceive critical characteristics as similar. 
  
 
A third related limitation stems from the phenomenon that members of socially 
attractive groups are inclined to actively obstruct the entry of interested out-group 
                                     
18  Taylor and Brown (1988) have shown that certain illusions, such as unrealistically positive self-
evaluations, exaggerated perceptions of control or mastery, and unrealistic optimism can be beneficial to 
mental health. I emphasize that self-deception in this context is conceptually very different. Instead of fo-
cusing on the individual, I refer to generalized social motives that extend to embrace the group, its proto-
type, and its members, because self and group are psychologically fused and because the group and its 
members validate each others cognitions and behaviors (Hogg, 1993). Therefore, feigned similarity is un-
likely to be sustainably enhance self-esteem.  
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members. In order to keep their in-group exclusive and to prevent distinct group 
characteristics from diffusion, required criteria to gain entry into the superior 
group may be either objectively immutable (e.g. race, nationality) or difficult to 
accomplish by means of own effort (e.g., educational attainment, professional ex-
perience). The emotional value attached to a group membership may partly stem 
from its exclusiveness. In organizational contexts, status and power differentials 
are usually preserved by officially assigned competences and obligations. 
 
Proposition 3:  
 
The opportunity to affiliate with an individually more favorable social group is 
contingent on the entry barriers created by the target group members.  
 
 
A fourth limitation to the individual choice of attractive groups refers to peer 
pressure and its underlying value system (Kandel and Lazear, 1992). Intra-group 
sanctions for any attempt to move into another group may be so powerful, that 
individuals feel impotent to leave their unfavorable group. The threat of being 
considered a “traitor” tends to prevent the creation of cognitive alternatives to the 
current group membership in order to preserve the status quo.  
 
Proposition 4:  
 
The opportunity to affiliate with an individually more favorable social group is 
contingent on the social pressure created by members in the current group.  
 
 
A fifth limitation to the pursuit of positive self-esteem refers to the specificity 
of social identities. Social identities are at least partially group-specific to the ex-
tent that interaction is interpersonal (e.g., due to the proximity, similarity, and task 
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interdependence of in-group members). Even if individuals manage to gain entry 
into their target group, the attainment of a full-value group member status usually 
requires more than a discrete either-or-choice. In most contexts new members 
learn the established policies, general role expectations, behavioral norms, power 
structures, and so forth (Ashforth, 1985). This learning process is generally termed 
socialization. Moreover, they must learn to interpret fellow members’ verbal and 
nonverbal responses in situated social interactions and accumulate experience in 
synchronizing their individual activities (van Maanen, 1979).19 Certain processes 
even become so internalized that their successful execution happens unconsciously 
and cannot be verbally explained (Lippman and Rumelt, 1982). In reference to the 
implicit character of collectively held expertise, Weick and Roberts (1993) coined 
the term „collective mind“. The essence of their argument is that in highly interac-
tive teams any member only has access to a part of the overall stock of the team-
based expertise because it is diffused among the team members.  
This implies that membership duration tends to increase with group-specificity. 
An individual, who leaves the group has to bear not only the costs of lost emotion-
al value attached to the respective group (which is likely to be compensated if the 
new group is socially more attractive), but also the loss or lost applicability of 
group-specific aspects like individual status and popularity or non-transferable 
knowledge. Likewise, when the group must fill its vacancy with new personnel the 
change in the group’s composition is likely to impact the existing prototype and 
increase uncertainty. In-group members may anticipate this consequence and pre-
ventively raise the emotional and moral costs for any attempt to leave the group.  
                                     
19  At an organizational level this argument is considerably less applicable because the emergence of organi-
zational identities is hardly based on interpersonal interaction. Organizational identities rather stem from 
those features that make the organization recognizable, legitimate its existence, and distinguish it from 
contextually salient other organizations (Albert and Whetten, 1985; Deephouse, 1999; Whetten and 
Mackey 2002; King, Felin, and Whetten, 2010). The emergence of its members’s social identification is 
rarely contingent on interpersonal interaction but rather on a depersonalized, consensual prototype. This 
does not mean that all members voluntarily accept the prototype in a similar way. Individual sovereignty 
is compromised by strict roles and hierarchical control (King, Felin, and Whetten, 2010). If participation 
in the accomplishment of superordinate organizational goals is not instrumental to the satisfaction of the 
individuals’ emotional, cognitve, social, and monetary needs, the individual can only adjust the valuation 
of the prototype, but not the prototype itself.  
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Generally, group-specific requirements for social identification reduce the 
group’s permeability and, thus, the opportunities for upward social mobility. This 
suggests that group-specificity is positively correlated with properties of group 
distinctiveness. The emergence and sustenance of prototype clarity is less prob-
lematic, when there are fewer turnovers and more collectively held expertise. I 
strongly emphasize that while highly specific social identities do not necessarily 
enhance self-esteem, they are particularly attractive to those who are motivated to 
reduce uncertainty. 
 
Proposition 5:  
 
The opportunity to affiliate with an individually more favorable social group is 
contingent on the group-specificity of both the current and the target group’s so-
cial identities. 
 
 
Proposition 6:  
 
Group-specificity of social identities reduces uncertainty but does not necessarily 
enhance self-esteem. 
  
A sixth limitation to the individual choice of attractive groups relates to indi-
viduals’ asymmetric information about their current in-group and a potential out-
group. Individuals generally possess more reliable information about their in-
group than about the contextually salient out-group. In social identity contexts the 
knowledge about the out-group will usually be confined to stereotypical infor-
mation. Scholars consistently contend that rationally bounded individuals rely on 
such heuristics, which may yield subjectively satisfactory but objectively unrea-
sonable judgments (Simon, 1957; Cyert and March, 1963; March and Simon, 
1958; Kahneman, Slovic, and Tversky, 1982). Stereotypes work from time to 
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time, but they can also be misleading. Likewise, the representative heuristic 
(Kahneman et al., 1982) in which judgments are based on the degree to which X is 
representative of Y, may be relevant in inter-group situations.  
The information deficiency toward the out-group implies that individuals need 
to take an increased risk into account when they consider moving into another 
group. In view of the motivation to reduce uncertainty about the self, information 
asymmetries between the current in-group and a potential out-group may be a rea-
sonable explanation for an individual’s tendency to prolong the existing member-
ship. In contrast to the other limitations discussed, information asymmetries do not 
necessarily refer to a limitation, which cannot be altered by the individual and 
must thus be accepted. Information asymmetries rather reduce the individual’s 
willingness to take the risk and make the effort to become a member of a more 
attractive group.20 
 
Proposition 7:  
 
The willingness to affiliate with an individually more favourable social group is 
contingent on informational asymmetries between in-group and out-group. 
Figure 1 illustrates both the sequential relationship between the need for uncer-
tainty and the need for self-esteem and the limitations to individual pursuit of self-
esteem according to the previous discussion.  
 
                                     
20  Similarly, individual responsiveness and adaptability to dynamics in the social environment may be de-
celerated by inertia, i.e., the potentially irrational reluctance to change the status quo. Hannan and Free-
man (1984) claim that this propensity is stronger in highly structured social realities like organizations, 
which typically constitute an inter-group context where group relations are stable and clearly. 
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Figure 1:  A Heuristic Model of the Relationship between the Need for Uncertainty 
Reduction and the Need for Self-Esteem in Social Identity Processes. 
 
 
I conclude from the elaboration that in an inherently dynamic social environ-
ment, where social identity processes must be responsive to inter-group dimen-
sions of immediate comparative contexts, the individual assessment of the current 
state of social identity requires repeated updating in order to keep uncertainty re-
duced. This is consistent with Samson’s (1978) proposition that individuals try to 
manage their lives in order to establish a sense of continuity in their identity (iden-
tity mastery). Although there is no final conclusive answer to the question “Who 
am I and what does this imply?”, an awareness of the status quo can be considered 
prerequisite for answering the logically subsequent question “Who do I want to be 
and what would that imply?” (i.e., the pursuit of self-esteem). As I have discussed, 
the latter question should be more realistically adjusted into “Given my perceived 
opportunities, who do I want to be and what would that imply?”  
In support of my argumentation, Reid and Hogg (2005) find that self-
conceptually uncertain individuals are motivated by uncertainty reduction to iden-
tify with a group, regardless of whether the group is of low or high status. Self-
conceptually certain individuals, on the contrary, are primarily motivated by the 
prospect of an enhanced self-esteem to identify with high- than with low-status 
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groups. Wilson, Centerbar, Kermer, and Gilbert (2005) provide additional support 
for the validity of my reasoning by showing that people even want to avoid uncer-
tainty when it prolongs pleasurable experiences.  
 
 
4.6 Motivational Consequences 
So far I have focused on how the external structure of the social environment lim-
its the pursuit of self-esteem as a motive for group affiliation. According to my 
argumentation the need for uncertainty reduction and the need for self-esteem are 
sequentially interrelated. It is important to note that my approach differs from 
Maslow’s (1943) pyramidal conceptualization of individual needs. I refer to gen-
eralized social motives that extend to embrace the group, its prototype, and its 
members, because self and group are psychologically fused and because the group 
and its members validate each other’s cognitions and behaviors (Hogg, 1993).  
Comparisons between current and possible, future-oriented social identities 
may have important motivational consequences that operate with differing urgen-
cy depending on the specific nature of the inter-group relation.  
If a group primarily feels that its distinctiveness is threatened, this perception 
will likely arouse the motivation to reduce uncertainty. In seeking uncertainty re-
duction, people probably pay as much attention to clarity of social structural dif-
ferentiation among groups as to in-group prototype clarity itself although the latter 
is the most direct source of self-definitional information. According to the princi-
ple of meta-contrast, prototype clarity is contingent on both intra-group homoge-
nization and inter-group differentiation. Potential consequences are increased in-
group favoritism, depersonalized social attraction for fellow in-group members, 
and satisfaction with stable social structural relations among groups. In an attempt 
to sustain or restore a distinct prototype within a homogenous and consensual 
group, prototypically central and, thus, more influential in-group members will be 
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inclined to reject prototypically marginal in-group members. “Negative” deviants, 
who are inclined toward the referential out-group prototype will be evaluatively 
downgraded, much like “positive” deviants, who are aprototypical in terms of their 
surpassing contribution to the group’s positivity. Both are equally dysfunctional as 
they jeopardize the in-group’s prototype clarity. 
 
Proposition 8:  
 
If group distinctiveness is threatened, the need for uncertainty reduction becomes 
more salient. In-group members will protect or strive for prototype clarity. 
 
 
If the group’s distinctiveness is perceived as stable but the evaluative positivity 
is under threat, the motivation to enhance self-esteem is likely to be aroused. In 
such cases “negative” deviants will be similarly rejected but “positive” deviants 
will be very welcome in-group members. The partial prototype diffusion will be 
accepted because it is situationally beneficial. In the long run, however, individual 
overachievement must be attributable to the group, reflecting relatively more posi-
tively on the valence of the in-group prototype and thus ultimately on self-esteem. 
The prospect of collectively increasing the in-groups positivity or of becoming a 
member of a superior group, respectively, may energize substantial effort. Like-
wise, it may promote patience with presently unfavorabe conditions by directing 
the perception on potential progress and improvement. 
Proposition 9:  
 
If group distinctiveness is perceived to be stable, the need for self-esteem becomes 
more salient. In-group members will tolerate situationally beneficial prototype 
diffusion. 
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4.7 Contextual Factors in Organizational Performance 
In this section, I aim to show how my extended view of social identity theory 
helps to understand the performance effects of a broad range of contextual factors 
in organizational design, comprising relative-pay schemes, internal labor markets, 
the integration of tacit knowledge, and the more complex processes associated 
with team-level diversity.  
 
 
4.7.1 Relative-Pay Schemes 
Proposition 9 states that single “positive” deviants, who jeopardize their in-
group’s prototype clarity will only be tolerated if their contribution is situationally 
beneficial and if the group’s distinctiveness is perceived as sufficiently stable. In 
the long run, however, individual overachievement must be attributable to the 
group, reflecting relatively more positively on the in-group prototype.  
Relative-pay schemes, which incentivize all workers to become “positive” de-
viants by outperforming their fellow in-group members (e.g., Lazear, 1989), are 
likely to undermine the group’s perceived distinctiveness or to impede the emer-
gence of a clear prototype, respectively. Personal identities will be more salient 
than the work team’s social identity because individual characteristics are more 
significant to the conception of a situation in which pay is merely based on indi-
vidual merits.  
It is well known that relative-pay schemes provide adverse incentives to sabo-
tage competitors (Lazear and Rosen, 1981; Lazear, 1989). I argue that, in addition, 
the lost potential to benefit from collective effort to establish group distinctiveness 
and to increase the in-groups positivity must be taken into account.  
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Proposition 10:  
 
Relative pay-systems undermine the group’s perceived distinctiveness or impede 
the emergence of a clear prototype, respectively. 
 
 
4.7.2 Internal Labor Markets 
Another contextually relevant characteristic of organizations is whether the inter-
nal labor market is open or closed. In open labor markets the employee-
organization relationship involves higher risk of termination, and vacancies are 
more likely to be filled through staff hired from outside the firm. Due to the em-
ployees’ expectation to be employed by several organizations, they are inclined 
not to develop a strong attachment to any employer. In such a culture of general-
ists with a prevalence of performance-based remuneration schemes, they develop 
more portable skills.  
In a closed internal labor market vacancies are mostly filled through internal 
promotion of existing staff within the firm. Careers typically take place in only 
one organization and remuneration schemes are largely based on seniority. Em-
ployees develop a strong attachment to their employer and are, thus, more willing 
to invest in organization- or group-specific human capital. There are fewer turno-
vers and more collectively held expertise (Baker, Jensen, and Murphy, 1988; 
Stroh, Brett, Baumann, and Reilly, 1996). 
This suggests that closed labor markets facilitate the emergence and sustenance 
of prototype clarity and group distinctiveness. Thus, organizations with closed 
labor markets can better suit the need to reduce uncertainty and they are more like-
ly to benefit more from their subunits effort to collectively increase their in-groups 
positivity.  
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Proposition 11:  
 
Organizations with closed labor markets can better suit the need to reduce uncer-
tainty and they are more likely to benefit more from their subunits effort to collec-
tively increase their in-groups positivity than organizations with open labor mar-
kets. 
 
 
4.7.3 Tacit Knowledge Integration 
The knowledge-based theory of the firm, introduced by Grant (1996), proposes 
that a firm’s key dynamic capability is its ability to integrate knowledge from dif-
ferent sources. According to Grant, the integration of tacit knowledge is of par-
ticular importance because it resides in individuals and cannot be explicitly con-
tracted. It is hardly imitable by competitors and can thus generate a sustainable 
competitive advantage. However, a critical element for the integration of tacit 
knowledge, which was not addressed by Grant (1996), relates to the willingness to 
share tacit knowledge between different organizational subunits.  
Given the in-groups tendency to overdifferentiate from similar, proximal, or sa-
lient out-groups (Tajfel and Turner, 1986), this may be particularly true if the 
knowledge integration concerns two groups at the same level within the organiza-
tional hierarchy. Competitively referential groups will feel threatened by a deterio-
ration of their in-group’s position in inter-group competition over scarce organiza-
tional resources. Their participation in inter-group activities will be characterized 
by group isolation rather than inter-group convergence and exchange.  
When the groups are hierarchically structured defensive biases in differentia-
tion by the subordinate group are less likely - at least as long as the hierarchical 
structure is viewed as legitimate or institutionalized (Caddick, 1982; Tajfel and 
Turner, 1986).  
Generally, any organizational subunit faces a trade-off associated with tacit 
84  Social Identity 
 
 
knowledge integration. On the one hand, the in-group’s distinctiveness, as a pre-
requisite for uncertainty reduction, may be compromised by the provision of tacit 
knowledge. On the other hand, tacit knowledge integration is no unilateral process 
but happens in exchange with another group. The gained knowledge may promote 
the in-group’s productivity, its perceived positivity, and eventually its members’ 
self-esteem.  
 
Proposition 12:  
 
Similar, proximal, or salient, but particularly competitively referential groups will 
tend to resist tacit knowledge integration due to biases in differentiation. 
 
 
4.7.4 Team Diversity  
Following Harrison and Klein (2007), team diversity may be conceptualized as the 
distribution of differences of a common characteristic across team members. Re-
searchers in this area commonly distinguish between relations-oriented and task-
oriented diversity (Jackson, Joshi, and Erhardt, 2003; Joshi and Roh, 2009). Rela-
tions-oriented diversity refers to “surface” characteristics, such as gender, age, or 
ethnicity, which are immediately observable. Task-oriented diversity involves 
diversity of “deeper” characteristics, such as knowledge or skills, which are not 
directly observable. A so far unresolved puzzle is why studies on team-level diver-
sity regularly find relations-oriented diversity to harm team performance, while 
task-oriented diversity tends to promote team performance.  
Generally, relations-oriented diversity makes it more difficult to find consensu-
al categorical attributes, which align the in-group members’ prototypical beliefs, 
attitudes, feelings, and behavior. Joshi and Roh (2009) argue that the lack of pro-
totype clarity leads group members to overemphasize inter-group differences with 
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salient out-groups in order to reduce the own perceived uncertainty. The resultant 
discriminatory behavior against out-groups is largely unproductive and, thus, ex-
plains the negative influence of relations-oriented diversity on team performance. 
I argue that the low degree of distinctiveness also undermines the in-group 
members’ willingness to collectively engage in productive activities. Contingent 
on the opportunities for individual social mobility, the members will look for al-
ternative groups that are more distinct and, if possible, positively valued. In line 
with my reasoning, van Knippenberg, De Dreu, and Homan (2004) find relations-
oriented homogeneity to be positively correlated with self-categorization process-
es.  
 
Proposition 13:  
 
Relations-oriented team diversity increases unproductive out-group discrimina-
tion and undermines the in-group members’ willingness to collectively engage in 
productive activities.  
 
 
Task-oriented diversity attributes, which are associated with skill-based and in-
formational differences among work group members, are assumed to constitute a 
team’s cognitive resource base (Jackson, May, and Whitney, 1995). More specifi-
cally, task-oriented diversity bears on intra-group processes, such as the exchange 
of information and perspectives, mutual feedback, and knowledge integration. If 
there are task-interdependent complementarities, these elaboration-based process-
es can explain the positive performance effects of task-oriented diversity at the 
team-level. I would like to add an intuitive explanation that derives directly from 
the extended social identity framework.  
Following Proposition 9, I argue that task-oriented diverse teams are more tol-
erant to partial prototype diffusion as long as it is consistently perceived as situa-
tionally beneficial. Besides, individual overachievement must, in the long term, be 
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attributable to the group. Quite contrary to tacit knowledge integration with anoth-
er organizational subunit, there is no risk to compromise the in-group’s distinc-
tiveness if all members provide their individual knowledge. If the group’s distinc-
tiveness is perceived as sufficiently stable, the prospect of collectively increasing 
the in-group’s positivity by exploiting the team’s potential in task-interdependent 
complementarities may energize substantial effort.  
 
Proposition 14: 
 
Task-oriented team diversity may energize substantial effort to collectively in-
crease the in-group’s positivity if the distinctiveness is perceived as sufficiently 
stable and if the potential in task-interdependent complementarities is consensual-
ly realized. 
 
 
 
4.8 Discussion and Conclusion 
Social identity as a sense of self, derived from membership in social groups, helps 
people to navigate their social lives, work-wise or other. The highly constitutive 
role of professional attainment in the evaluation of self and others is hardly sur-
prising for two basic reasons. First, most people spend a major part of their life-
time at work. Second, most working people do not do their job in isolation but 
rather as part of a team with interdependent tasks and shared responsibility for 
outcomes.  
In this chapter I have made an attempt to address associated questions organiza-
tions are increasingly confronted with, such as how employees align individual 
and group interests so that they collectively engage in activities that benefit their 
group, or how different organizational subunits interact in a collaborative way. My 
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goal was to extend the conventional wisdom about how collective self-conception 
influences and is influenced by organizational processes. I provided a careful in-
depth discussion on the relationship between the underlying core motives for 
group affiliation, i.e., the need for self-esteem and the need for uncertainty reduc-
tion. So far, many researchers have tended to strongly emphasize the need for self-
esteem, while neglecting the need to reduce uncertainty about one’s social identi-
ty. The theoretical analysis, however, revealed that both motives for social identity 
processes can reasonably be assumed to be sequentially interrelated. The need for 
uncertainty reduction was found to be the more fundamental motive. I showed that 
the need for self-esteem is often subject to a set of limitations, particularly in high-
ly structured social environments like organizations. Moreover, I elaborated on the 
differing conditions for activation and the respective motivational consequences of 
both needs and derived a variety of rather general, but testable, propositions, 
which help frame future research directions in the study intra- and inter-group 
processes in organizational contexts.  
In a subsequent step towards a better understanding of social identity processes 
I applied the extended theoretical framework to specific contextually relevant as-
pects of organizational design. Prior applications of social identity theory have 
proved to be incapable of explaining largely inconsistent findings (e.g., Joshi and 
Roh, 2009). Specifically, I (i) explain when relative-pay schemes tend to improve 
or decrease team productivity, (ii) make predictions about the differing social 
identity processes in open and closed internal labor markets, (iii) make predictions 
about the ease of tacit knowledge integration in firms, and (iv) reconcile previous-
ly contradicting results on relations-oriented and task-oriented team diversity 
measures.  
I am confident that my contribution to a better understanding of social identity 
processes offers a lot of potential for future research. First and foremost, empirical 
work should evaluate the validity of the theoretical propositions. While most of 
the propositions build on previous work in the area of social psychology, I need 
reliable field evidence from organizational contexts. 
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Another promising avenue for future research concerns the investigation of the 
relationship between an individual’s multiple social identities. Van Knippenberg 
et al. (2004) acknowledge that the number of distinct identities and their specific 
content vary from person to person. Given that employees’ psychological well-
being depends on their portfolio of social identities, future work should consider 
how multiple group memberships within the organization (e.g., in different project 
teams and/or work teams), and outside the organization (e.g., family, friends) in-
terfere with each other. Particularly for long-term employments, the employers 
should have a direct interest in sufficiently diversified portfolios to reduce the risk 
that their employees experience a personal crisis. Results from a recent survey by 
the polling firm Gallup indicate the demand for action in the field (Terpitz, 2009). 
For instance in Germany, more than four out of five employees professed to be in 
a state of “inner resignation”. They were more frequently ill and exhibited sub-
stantially less creativity in their jobs. Considering the well documented, positive 
correlation between organizational identification, work satisfaction, and individual 
productivity as well as potential additional replacement costs for personnel selec-
tion, contracting, training and so forth, the economic relevance of this issue is im-
mense. 
A related direction for future work alludes to the potential conflict between so-
cial identities and situational strength. According to Meyer, Dalal, and Hermida 
(2010), situational strength refers to “implicit or explicit cues provided by external 
entities regarding the desirability of potential behaviors” (p. 122) [my italics]. The 
idea behind situational strength is expressed in the notion that “the situation (or 
various characteristics thereof) might restrict the expression of individual differ-
ences” (p. 122). Bureaucratic organizations, which emphasize individual account-
ability and the predictability of social behavior in order to control and direct the 
activities of their organizational members (March and Simon, 1958), are particu-
larly characterized by a high degree of situational strength. Situational strength 
can be conceptualized as a depersonalized prototype, which aligns behavior. How-
ever, it does not consensually emerge from the group members’ interpersonal in-
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teraction. It is rather externally imposed and provides prescriptive behavioral 
guidance. To the extent that organizational members perceive situational strength 
as not instrumental to the satisfaction of their social needs, they can only adjust 
their valuation of the prescribed prototype, but not the prototype itself. The benefit 
to the organization remains open to scrutiny. On the one hand, a high degree of 
situational strength may satisfy the need for uncertainty reduction. On the other 
hand, it may conflict with internally emerged group prototypes and/or refuse the 
group to collectively increase its perceived positivity. I thus see an important task 
for future work in investigating the relationship between social identity processes 
and situational strength.  
Moreover, I believe that the theoretical framework would prove helpful to gain 
further insight in group empowerment and its associated processes. Group em-
powerment might reduce the perceived uncertainty as it reduces the power and 
status differential with superordinate out-groups and, thus, improves the in-
group’s relative position in the organizational hierarchy. Equally, group empow-
erment may provide a “toolkit” for group members to collectively increase the 
perceived positivity and satisfy the need for self-esteem. At the same time, it is not 
clear how collectively caused negative outcomes are attributed. It would be inter-
esting to investigate the resultant social identity processes if team members are 
directly responsible for unfavorable outcomes. 
The last promising research avenue I want to point out concerns the phenome-
non of mobbing at the workplace. Mobbing involves conscious psychological har-
assment and discrimination of ostensibly weaker co-workers and can result in se-
vere psychological and occupational consequences for the victims (Leymann, 
1990). An extensive discussion is beyond the scope of this chapter, but the basic 
line of reasoning might be that discriminatory behavior against in-group members 
is a coping strategy by fellow members of socially devalued groups to mitigate 
their perceived inferiority. Possibly due to insufficient group distinctiveness, per-
sonal identities are more salient than the work team’s social identity. Without a 
consensual prototype, which induces behavioral alignment, individual characteris-
90  Social Identity 
 
 
tics become more significant to the conception of a situation and make room for 
interpersonal discrimination. 
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5 Summary and Outlook 
Virtually every type and size of organization commits substantial resources to 
team-based initiatives because individuals working as part of a team with interde-
pendent tasks and shared responsibility for outcomes generally achieve something 
beyond the capabilities of individuals working alone. More specifically, organiza-
tions increasingly rely on the their employees’ diverse but collaboratively related 
competencies, skills, knowledge, and experiences in order to respond quickly and 
adaptively to highly dynamic circumstances. While the explanations why business 
success largely depends on teamwork is intuitive and unquestioned, the explana-
tions how organizations can sustain their competitive edge are relatively opaque, 
and still largely open to scrutiny. 
The aim of this dissertation was to contribute to the literature on teams in organi-
zational contexts by addressing three specific issues that currently challenge 
scholars. In two empirical approaches and one conceptual, I have gained further 
insight in the underlying processes of team effectiveness.  
 
In chapter 2 “Specific Human Capital as a Source of Superior Team Perfor-
mance”, I investigated whether a team’s shared experience in working together 
(i.e., its stock of team-specific human capital) positively affects team performance. 
Using professional soccer teams from the German Bundesliga as an example of 
highly interactive teams, I employed the number of deployments in league match-
es as a proxy variable for team-specific human capital. In contrast to previous 
studies, which measure pure tenure or rely on survey data, the specification better 
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reflects team members’ cumulative experience in cooperating. Besides, my ap-
proach is likely to be more conclusive because the empirical analysis is based on a 
larger sample than that used by any other related study.  
Holding a team’s stock of general human capital (i.e., playing talent) and other 
potential drivers constant, I found support for a positive relationship between 
shared experience and team performance. I were able to show that the relationship 
is not linear but concave in shape, which can convincingly be explained by learn-
ing effects. Moreover, the results indicate that team members should not only be 
retained in the team but should also be similarly experienced in playing for the 
current team. 
The finding that a player’s specific relationships with teammates matter implies 
that the loss of team-specific human capital in the case of a transfer should be ac-
counted for in any club’s investment decision regarding the engagement of new 
players. The failure to consider this aspect may explain the occasional observation 
that a soccer player turns out to be a flop after a transfer to a new team because he 
does not meet expectations.  
 
In chapter 3 “How Expectations Affect Managerial Change”, I investigated the 
antecedents of the decision to terminate a managerial employment. Like in chapter 
2, I chose the domain of soccer over other industries because of the considerable 
advantages for empirical testing. Thus, I considered the head coach to be the anal-
ogy of a manager in a firm. The empirical evidence of previous studies on this 
economically highly relevant topic is largely contradictory. There is yet a general 
consensus on the critical importance of performance expectations, but the problem 
of specification has only deficiently been solved so far. A related drawback of 
many existing studies is that hey are incapable of estimating deviations from ex-
pectations because they lack objective and reliable performance data that the team 
leader can be held accountable for.  
I managed to overcome these obstacles by using detailed team performance da-
ta from the German Bundesliga and an innovative specification of performance 
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expectations based on supplementary betting odds. The results conclusively 
demonstrate that (i) the probability of a coach dismissal increases with expecta-
tions, even after controlling for the actual performance of he team and that (ii) 
coaches are more likely to be fired if they fail to meet expectations, compared to 
peers with equal performance who meet or beat expectations. Thus, expectations 
affect managerial change even beyond the performance.  
Future research should expand my approach by including matches other than 
Bundesliga ones, i.e., national and international cup matches. I argue that the 
coach’s job tenure should depend on all his team’s performances throughout his 
spell, except for friendly matches. In order to validate the generalizability of the 
findings, my approach should be applied to other leagues and other teams sports.  
 
In chapter 4 “Motives for Social Identity Processes in Organizations”, I have 
made an attempt to challenge conventional wisdom on the motives for social iden-
tity processes in organizational settings. Drawing on social identity theory, my aim 
was to advance the theoretical framework in order to increase the understanding of 
intra- and inter-group processes at work. 
I provided a careful in-depth discussion on the relationship between the under-
lying core motives for group affiliation, i.e., the need for self-esteem and the need 
for uncertainty reduction. So far, many researchers have tended to strongly em-
phasize the need for self-esteem, while neglecting the need to reduce uncertainty 
about one’s social identity. My analysis, however, revealed that both motives for 
social identity processes are likely to be sequentially interrelated. The need for 
uncertainty reduction was found to be the more fundamental motive. I showed that 
the need for self-esteem is often subject to a set of limitations, particularly in high-
ly structured social environments like organizations. Moreover, I elaborated on the 
differing conditions for activation and the respective motivational consequences of 
both needs and derived a variety of rather general, but testable, propositions, 
which help frame future research directions in the study intra- and inter-group 
processes in organizational contexts.  
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In a subsequent step towards a better understanding of social identity processes 
I applied the extended theoretical framework to specific contextually relevant as-
pects of organizational design. Prior applications of social identity theory have 
proved to be incapable of explaining largely inconsistent findings (e.g., Joshi and 
Roh, 2009). Specifically, I am able (i) to explain when relative-pay schemes tend 
to improve or decrease team productivity, (ii) to make predictions about the differ-
ing social identity processes in open and closed internal labor markets, (iii) to 
make predictions about the ease of tacit knowledge integration in firms, and (iv) to 
reconcile previously contradicting results on relations-oriented and task-oriented 
team diversity measures.  
I am confident that my contribution to a better understanding of social identity 
processes offers a lot of potential for future research. First and foremost, empirical 
work should evaluate the validity of my theoretical propositions. While most of 
my propositions build on previous work in the area of social psychology, I need 
reliable field evidence from organizational contexts. 
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